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     his article reflects on the continuing ways in which old ideas of what is 
permitted in time of War continue to play a role when it comes to the use of 
force against merchant shipping and seizing such ships and their cargo on 
the high seas.1  
Prize courts are central to this story. Stephen Neff traces prize courts to 
the unilateral measures taken by England in the thirteenth century and by 
France in 1400; they were essentially courts set up by the sovereign to adju-
dicate captures at sea. “The original function of prize courts was to compile 
an official inventory of captured goods, to ensure that the government re-
ceived its full share of any booty.”2  
Such jurisdiction in more recent centuries has, in the United Kingdom, 
been dependent on a specific declared War. The last time it was used fol-
lowed the 1939 Order issued by King George VI authorizing prize court 
jurisdiction over seized German property. That Order was authorized by 
powers under the 1894 Prize Courts Act, which states that the prize court 
shall act only upon a “proclamation” that War has “broken out.”3 The earlier 
Order in Council authorizing the commissioners to apply prize law for the 
First World War refers to “a state of war between this Country and the Ger-
man Empire.”4  
King George VI’s Order of September 5, 1939, contains only two oper-
ative paragraphs and might helpfully be reproduced here in part (not least 
because it was quite tricky to find) in order to get a flavor of what it means 
to trigger the law of prize and prize court jurisdiction. The text essentially 
states that, because of the State of War, the United Kingdom can, in the 
context of naval warfare, lawfully seize everything belonging to the enemy 
State, its nationals, and inhabitants. It then establishes prize court jurisdiction 
to adjudicate these matters: 
 
WHEREAS a state of war now exists between this Country and the Ger-
man Reich so that His Majesty’s Fleets, Ships and Aircraft may lawfully 
                                                                                                                      
1. In order to distinguish between armed conflicts in general and situations that can be 
considered as constituting a State of War under national and international law, this article 
distinguishes between war with a small “w” and War with a capital “W.” 
2. STEPHEN NEFF, THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRALS 24–5 (2000).  
3. Prize Courts Act 1894, 57 & 58 Vict. c. 39, § 2(1)–(3). 













seize all ships, vessels, aircraft and goods belonging to the said German 
Reich or to the Citizens and Subjects thereof, or other persons inhabiting 
within any of the countries, territories, or dominions of the said German 
Reich, and bring the same to judgment in any such Courts as shall be duly 
commissioned to take cognizance thereof . . . . 
 
We do hereby authorize and enjoin you . . . to take cognizance of and judi-
cially proceed upon all and all manner of captures, recaptures, seizures, 
prizes and reprisals of all ships, vessels, aircraft, and goods already seized 
and taken, and which hereafter shall be seized and taken, and to hear and 
determine the same, and according to the course of Admiralty and Law of 
Nations, and Statutes, Rules, and Regulations for the time being in force in 
that behalf, and goods as shall belong to the said German Reich or to the 
Citizens or Subjects thereof, or to any other persons inhabiting within any 
of the countries, territories, or dominions of the said German Reich or 
which are otherwise condemnable as Prize.5 
 
In a separate proclamation on the same day the King specified what the 
United Kingdom would treat as “‘Contraband of War”: 
 
Whereas a state of War exists between Us, on the one hand, and Germany 
on the other: 
 
And Whereas it is necessary to specify the Articles which it is our intention 
to treat as Contraband of War: 
 
. . . the Articles in Schedule I hereto will be treated as Absolute Contraband 
[arms, ammunition, fuel, means of transportation and components thereof, 
all means of communication, currency, metal, machinery, etc.] the Articles 
in Schedule II hereto will be treated as Conditional Contraband . . . All 
kinds of food, foodstuffs, feed, forage, and clothing and articles and mate-
rials used in their production.6    
 
The key controversies in the law on contraband and prize are covered by 
customary international law and are not likely to be dealt with in any new 
treaty-making process. Natalino Ronzitti’s evaluation from the 1980s re-
mains realistic:  
 
                                                                                                                      
5. 2 STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS 3605 (1939). 












Modernization is, however, a difficult task. The great maritime Powers 
seem to be happy to live with the old law rather than embark on a process 
of revision which would involve States with insignificant navies and even 
land-locked countries.7 
 
While there is some existing treaty law and there have even been prose-
cutions for breaches of the rules of naval warfare amounting to war crimes,8 
the contemporary law with regard to seizure of enemy merchant shipping 
and goods, seizure of neutral merchant ships, seizure of enemy state-owned 
military equipment, the operation of prize courts, and the rights of neutral 
shipping, is in all cases relatively uncertain and contested. Moreover, just be-
cause certain action was accepted as legal as recently as the last two World 
                                                                                                                      
7. Natalino Ronzitti, The Crisis of the Traditional Law Regulating International Armed Conflict 
at Sea and the Need for Revision, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREE-
MENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 51 (Natalino Ronzitti ed., 1988). See more 
recently, making the same point, J. Ashley Roach, Submarine Warfare, MAX PLANCK ENCY-
CLOPEDIAS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 34 (updated Mar. 2017), https://opil.ou-
plaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e412?rskey=DBR 
ymj&result=1&prd=MPIL (“Such a conference would presumably be open to representa-
tives from all nations and non-governmental organizations who would not, for the most 
part, have significant interests as potential participants and would have little or no practical 
experience in the conduct they would seek to regulate. Of the more than 150 coastal and 
island States, only a small fraction have a significant naval capacity or experience in naval 
warfare. Another 40 States are landlocked. Consequently, unless the rules of procedure of 
such a conference provided for all decisions, particularly on matters of substance, to be 
taken by consensus, or unless the conference could be limited to significant naval powers, 
those States without significant interests at stake would probably have the votes to decide 
matters of vital importance to naval powers without their consent.”). Heintschel von Hei-
negg suggested that some of the necessary updating to the rules could be accomplished 
through a meeting of experts to revise the San Remo Manual. Wolff Heintschel von Hei-
negg, The Development of the Law of Naval Warfare from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century—
Some Selected Issues, 30 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 69 (2014). 
Such an exercise started in 2019. U.S. Naval War College Hosts Conference on Revisions to Legal 
Manual Regarding Armed Conflict at Sea (Dec. 31, 2019), https://usnwc.edu/News-and-
Events/News/US-Naval-War-College-Hosts-Conference-on-Revisions-to-Legal-Manual-
Regarding-Armed-Conflict-at-Sea. James Kraska has made the point that “some of the con-
cepts and provisions in the regime are aging; others are rather opaque. Uncertainty in the 
regime and inconsistency in its application push the door ajar to disagreement and height-
ened tension.” James Kraska, Military Operations, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
THE SEA 866, 866 (Donald Rothwell et al. eds., 2015). 
8. For a look at some of the war crimes trials in the twentieth century, see William 
Fenrick, Legal Aspects of Targeting in the Law of Naval Warfare, 29 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF 












Wars does not necessarily mean that we should automatically accept that the 
same rules continue to apply to all armed conflicts today.9 
Unlike the contemporary law on land warfare, the practice of maritime 
warfare in international armed conflicts (and most would agree that the law 
of naval economic warfare is limited to international armed conflicts10) 
would at first glance seem to involve some pretty draconian rights for bellig-
erent States with regard to merchant (civilian) ships, their crews, and the 
property of foreigners. In part, this is sometimes explained by the idea that 
land warfare takes place “within the territory of some state, whereas naval 
warfare is very largely carried on in the ‘no man’s land’ of the high seas.”11  
The history of the thinking on these topics considers a “right to fight” 
alongside a competing “right to trade.” As Herbert Smith explained in 1948, 
“At bottom it is the question of trying to reconcile two conflicting rights, 
each in itself quite legitimate—the right of the belligerent to defeat his enemy 
and the right of the neutral to carry on his normal trade.”12  
The questions we will be asking in this article are these: is it legitimate in 
the twenty-first century for a State that has decided to go to war (or initiate 
an international armed conflict) to continue to claim such “Belligerent 
Rights,” based on a “right” to defeat an enemy State, so that the rights or 
expectations of neutrals or “enemy nationals” to trade in goods unrelated to 
direct military action are extinguished? Should a belligerent State be entitled 
                                                                                                                      
9. There are almost no treaties in force that cover these areas. Past initiatives that sought 
to codify and develop the law include Institut de droit international, Règlement international 
des prises maritimes (1897); Institut de droit international, Manual of the Laws of Naval 
War (1913); Declaration Concerning the Laws of Maritime War, Feb. 26, 1909, 208 Consol. 
T.S. 338, reprinted in THE DECLARATION OF LONDON, FEBRUARY 26, 1909, at 112 (James B. 
Scott ed., 1919) [hereinafter The London Declaration] (an unratified treaty signed by ten 
naval powers); and the Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States 
in Naval and Aerial War, 33 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 
175 (1939). More recently, see SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE 
TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald Beck ed., 1995) (hereinafter SAN REMO 
MANUAL); and PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HAR-
VARD UNIVERSITY, COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AP-
PLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2010) (hereinafter HARVARD MANUAL ON AIR 
WARFARE). 
10. See, e.g., WILLIAM BOOTHBY & WOLFF HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, THE LAW OF 
WAR: A DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL 326 (2018). 













to acquire property rights over every enemy ship and plane (along with its 
enemy cargo) just because this belligerent State has the capacity to capture 
them?  
The idea of Belligerent Rights in naval warfare includes capturing enemy 
ships and their cargoes on the high seas. The idea is that the property rights 
in the vessels and the cargo are then acquired by the capturing belligerent 
State after condemnation (also known as a confiscation) in a Prize Court.13 
No one now accepts that one can seize private enemy property on land, so 
what rationale remains for seizing on the high seas private enemy ships and 
their cargo, while also retaining the right to intern their crew as prisoners of 
war?14 
It may be that in the past it was accepted that the Law of Nations entitled 
the aggrieved side to retake in reprisal (repriser) what is owed to them. And 
it was once accepted that States authorized privateers (private individuals in 
charge of private ships) in time of War to seize those enemy goods by using 
their merchant ships and crew.15 But today such authorization of private 
force against foreign ships is outlawed for such purposes. The State can no 
longer, since the Paris Declaration of 1856, authorize privateers to carry out 
such seizures. Moreover, at least since the UN Charter in 1945, the State 
itself is no longer entitled to engage in forceful reprisals to right a wrong.16 
It may also be that historically it was considered that all merchant sailors 
could be easily redeployed to the armed forces, and that merchant ships 
could potentially easily be requisitioned for the war effort, but can such ra-
tionales for capturing merchant ships still stand? And does not this blurring 
of the distinction between military and civilian objects hinder rather than 
                                                                                                                      
13. See, e.g., UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW 
OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶¶ 13.99–13.104 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL]; SAN REMO MAN-
UAL, supra note 9, ¶¶ 135–40. 
14. For a traditional statement of the law, see C. JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 49 (6th ed. 1967) (“All private property on land, enemy and neu-
tral, is free from confiscation, but all is equally subject to requisition. On the other hand, 
enemy merchant ships and goods at sea are liable to capture.” He then explains the “ancient 
principle” regarding interning enemy merchant crew as prisoners of war. Compare this law 
of naval warfare customary rule with Article 105 of the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (1982) with regard to seizure in the context of piracy.). 
15. For detailed study in one particular context, see FAYE KERT, PRIZE AND PREJU-
DICE: PRIVATEERING AND NAVAL PRIZE IN ATLANTIC CANADA IN THE WAR OF 1812 
(1997). 











help uphold modern international humanitarian law, which starts out by 
stressing the need to distinguish between combatants and civilians? 
Challenging the idea of these Belligerent Rights derived from War need 
not throw into chaos the whole of the laws of war. We could confine our-
selves at this stage to rethinking some of the rules related to traditional mar-
itime warfare as they relate to capture of enemy and neutral ships. My com-
plaint with the traditional law as currently understood is that we cannot re-
ward the aggressor State with Belligerent Rights that States have accumulated 
under the old legal institution of War. 
I will not, however, be suggesting that such Belligerent Rights cannot be 
claimed by the aggressor but should remain unaffected for the State acting 
in self-defense. As is well known, all States claim to be acting in self-defense 
or for some other legitimate cause. What I will suggest is that, with regard to 
private property, no seizure or capture rights for any belligerents should flow 
merely from the fact of being in a State of War or in an international armed 
conflict. This focus on private property at sea may seem to be a rather niche 
preoccupation, but the idea that a belligerent State is entitled to seize the 
private property of the enemy at sea, and the vessels of neutrals accused of 
breaching blockade or carrying contraband, has significant knock-on effects. 
For example, refusing visit or capture exposes merchant ships to attack. 
Moreover, the rules that are said to allow for capture also allow for the de-
struction of enemy civilian aircraft and neutral merchant ships where capture 
and adjudication for prize are not feasible.17 Perhaps the time has come to 
remove the idea that, in war, the high seas involve a battle for private prop-
erty and the means to strangle the enemy’s economy. To continue to coun-
tenance such old rules related to the capture of merchant ships in a State of 
War is to encourage a state of mind whereby the enemy is much more than 
the military forces one faces in battle. 
To the extent that navies resort to inspection, interception, diversion, 
capture, seizure, confiscation, or acquisition against private ships on the high 
seas, I would suggest that the legal basis for such action ought to be confined 
to the international law covering self-defense, and not ancient traditions 
                                                                                                                      
17. For the rules proposed relating to destruction as an “exceptional measure,” see SAN 
REMO MANUAL, supra note 9, ¶ 151 (for neutral vessels) and Rule 135 of the HARVARD 












dressed up as “Belligerent Rights,” even if the thinking that attempts to jus-
tify such rights goes back centuries.18 
Henry Maine, Whewell Professor of International Law at the University 
of Cambridge, sought in his lectures in 1887 on international law to explain 
the rationale for an international law right for a belligerent State to seize pri-
vate enemy property on the high seas. His reasoning traces the idea back to 
Roman law: 
 
The elements of the subject are simple. When two states go to war, the 
ships, public and private, of one are, relatively to the other, so many articles 
of movable property floating on the sea. The capture of one of them by a 
ship of the other belligerent is prima facie regulated by the same principle 
as the seizure on land of a valuable movable by a soldier or body of soldiers. 
The law on the subject descends to us directly from the Roman Law. The 
property of an enemy is one of those things which the Roman Law in one 
of its oldest portions considers to be res nullius – no man’s property. It 
may be taken just as a wild bird or wild animal is taken, by seizing it with 
the intention to keep it . . . .19  
 
I wonder if today a lecturer could really explain the right to seize private 
property by analogy to the Roman law right to seize wild animals. But today 
the law books and manuals see no need to explain this ancient Belligerent 
Right. The Belligerent Right to capture enemy property on the high seas ap-




The concept of war booty is as old as recorded history. It has developed 
over a period of many centuries from the ancient practice by which the 
individual soldier was considered to be entitled to take whatever he could 
                                                                                                                      
18. One might also inquire if such rights ever had any credible foundation as a matter 
of morality or universal law. Neff’s conclusion is clear: “The concept of belligerents’ rights 
is a delusion.” Stephen C. Neff, The Prerogatives of Violence – In Search of the Conceptual Founda-
tions of Belligerents’ Rights, 38 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 41, 71 (1995). 
19. HENRY MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED BE-
FORE THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, 1887, at 94–95 (1888). 
20. See, e.g., UK MANUAL, supra note 13, ¶¶ 12.91–12.96, 13.99–13.104; SAN REMO 
MANUAL, supra note 9, ¶¶ 135–145; HARVARD MANUAL ON AIR WARFARE, supra note 9, r. 












find and carry away, to the modern rule under which only the state is enti-
tled to seize property as war booty.21  
 
In naval warfare, in the past “everything above the gun deck was the property 
of the captors, aught else had to be brought into the Prize Court.”22 
The contemporary law of war foresees, in treaty law dating from 1907, 
that in an inter-State armed conflict, an “army of occupation” can take pos-
session of the cash, movable property, arms, means of transport and supplies 
that belong to the enemy State “which may be used for military opera-
tions.”23 Transport vehicles, weapons, and munitions, as well as appliances 
for the transmission of news, belonging to private persons “may be seized,” 
                                                                                                                      
21. William Downey, Captured Enemy Property: Booty of War and Seized Enemy Property, 44 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 488, 490 (1950). For an interpretation of 
Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Article 18, concerning the obligation to 
protect the shipwrecked from pillage, see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED 
CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND GENEVA CONVENTION ¶ 1669 (2d ed. 2017), 
which states that “there is a recognized right in international armed conflict to capture as 
war booty any movable property belonging to the enemy State. Booty of war covers all types 
of enemy movable public property that can be used for military operations, such as arms 
and munitions. If individuals were to take these types of public goods from a wounded or 
sick person in a situation of armed conflict at sea, it might not amount to pillage if it is 
handed over to the State. If such goods are taken for private use, however, that would con-
stitute pillage and would contravene the prohibition in Article 18.” The COMMENTARY also 
suggests that a civilian aircraft temporarily used for exclusively medical purposes could be 
taken by the enemy State through condemnation through prize court, while a military air-
craft in the same situation could be captured as “booty of war.” Id. ¶ 2621.  
22. ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 28. This right was abolished in favor of a share for the 
captors. “The practice of pillage, however, led to great abuse and was abolished by an Act 
passed in the reign of William and Mary.” Id. at 5. For the rule relating to the sailors’ right 
to everything above the gundeck, see Rule 10 in the ancient Black Book of the Admiralty (“In 
the case of any ship or vessel of the enemy being taken as prize by any ship of our fleet, 
then the captors shall have for their own use all manner of goods and furniture found above 
the hatches, or the forecastle or the poop of the said vessels, saving always the ancient 
customs and usages of the sea.”). 
23. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 53, annexed to 
Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. See also Anicée Van Engeland, 
Protection of Public Property, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 1545–46 












but “they must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.”24 
The old law of war institution of “booty” has been mostly overtaken by these 
treaty rules, but the concept of booty is still used in military manuals to out-
line the rules applicable to property seized on the battlefield (and not as part 
of an occupation). In particular, booty of war is used with regard to certain 
property found on prisoners of war.25 So the UK Manual refers to “booty of 
war” when explaining that personnel who find sums of money belonging to 
the enemy State on a prisoner of war have to hand over the money to the 
capturing government. Such money becomes “booty of war” and the prop-
erty of the capturing government.26 Battlefield booty is arguably not con-
strained by the rule that the property “may be used for military purposes.”27 
But the uniforms, articles for personal use, and private property of prisoners 
of war are protected,28 as is other enemy private property (with the possible 
exception of privately-owned weapons, etc.).29 
                                                                                                                      
24. Hague Regulations, supra note 23, art. 53. For a detailed look at the relationship 
between this provision and “cases governed by naval law,” see Marco Longobardo, The 
Occupation of Maritime Territory under International Humanitarian Law, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STUDIES 322, 355–61 (2019). See also Hague Regulations, art. 52 for requisitions; Zutaka 
Arai-Takahashi, Protection of Private Property, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COM-
MENTARY 1521–24, supra note 23. 
25. Some manuals still refer to State property seized by an occupying army as “booty 
of war.” See FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (Germany), ZDV 15/2, LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT MANUAL ¶ 553 (2013) [hereinafter GERMAN MANUAL]. 
26. UK MANUAL, supra note 13, ¶ 8.25(g). 
27. See 2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE ¶ 139 (Hersch Lauterpacht 
ed., 7th ed. 1952). See also id. at ¶ 144 for private property. 
28. See Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 18, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Hague Regulations, supra note 23, art. 4; Convention 
(I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in 
the Field arts. 15–16, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea arts. 18–19, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, for property on the 
wounded, sick, and dead in the field, and on the shipwrecked. 
29. The U.S. Law of War Manual states: “In general, enemy private movable property 
on the battlefield may be seized if the property is susceptible to direct military use, i.e., it is 
necessary and indispensable for the conduct of war. This includes arms, ammunition, mili-
tary papers, or property that can be used as military equipment (e.g., as a means of trans-
portation or communication).” OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 5.17.3 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016) (footnote omitted) [herein-
after U.S. LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. The French Manuel de droit des conflits armés (2012) allows 












More significantly, it is understood under customary international law 
that warships, military aircraft, and other vessels (including their cargo) be-
longing to the State can be captured by the enemy State, and ownership 
passes immediately to the capturing State. Some authorities still refer to such 
captures as “booty of war.”30 The property can be sold, and the only excep-
tion to capture in this context would be cultural property.31 This customary 
rule is stated in the International Committee of the Red Cross study on cus-
tomary international humanitarian law as Rule 49: “The parties to the con-
flict may seize military equipment belonging to an adverse party as war 
booty.”32 It should be stressed that the customary rules that entitle parties to 
seize and take ownership of “war booty” are confined to international armed 
conflicts—conflicts between States.33 So property belonging to the other side 
always refers to State property. 
Interestingly, various government manuals, and even the International 
Committee of the Red Cross study on customary international humanitarian 
law, refer to such property as “war booty” or “booty of war,” or “butin de 
guerre” in French. On reflection, this makes some sense; one needs the con-
cept of war here to help justify the rule, with its associated idea that the win-
ner takes it all, or at least as much as is necessary to continue to wage war 
and pay for the occupation. One can hardly derive such a rule from principles 
                                                                                                                      
See also Yoram Dinstein, Booty in Warfare, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW ¶ 8 (updated Sept. 2015), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/ 
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e256?rskey=r2j804&result=1&prd=MPIL. 
The latest New Zealand Manual of Armed Forces Law excludes, however, all private prop-
erty from being considered booty. 4 NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE, DM (2 ed), MANUAL 
OF ARMED FORCES LAW: LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT §§ 8.10.35, 12.3.17 (2019). 
30. GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 25, ¶¶ 1025, 1129; U.S. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra 
note 29, §§ 13.4.3, 14.3.1. 
31. See Yue Zhang, Customary International Law and the Rule Against Taking Cultural Property 
as Spoils of War, 17 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 943–89 (2018); Convention 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 
U.N.T.S. 240. 
32. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 174 (2005) (“With respect to non-international armed con-
flicts, no rule could be identified which would allow, according to international law, the 
seizure of military equipment belonging to an adverse party, nor was a rule found which 
would prohibit such seizure under international law.”). 
33. DANISH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MILITARY MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
RELEVANT TO DANISH ARMED FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS ch. 10, ¶ 2.8 
(2016) (“A party to a conflict in IAC may lawfully seize and confiscate war booty.” “Con-












of humanity or some humanitarian imperative. The rule must derive from 
ancient practices in war; but having outlawed going to war, alongside the 
institution of War, how can States retain such Belligerent Rights? The idea 
of booty of war forces us to ask ourselves today, with the outlawry of war 
and the criminalization of aggression, why does the same international legal 
order authorize either State to acquire and keep such war booty? 
Having outlawed recourse to war and rendered illegitimate the legal ac-
quisition of territory through force, it seems anomalous that States can still 
acquire ownership of the movable property of the enemy State through the 
institution of “war booty.” This not only covers military equipment, arms, 
and ammunition, but also can include cash, securities, and even horses con-
sidered part of the army. In 1945, the U.S. Army famously took over one 
hundred Hungarian thoroughbred horses, “captured in combat” from the 
German Army, who had in turn captured the horses in Hungary and re-
moved them to Germany. The horses were then shipped in a stormy Atlantic 
crossing to the United States for a U.S. Army breeding program. A request 
from Hungary for their return was heard in a special subcommittee of the 
U.S. Senate, and the thoroughbred horses were understood as a matter of 
law to be war booty.34 One might also mention French wine vats seized by 
the German Army in the Second World War and sold to a private buyer,35 
and even the two million cigars destined for the German Army, along with 
tobacco leaf for four million more cigars.36 
While there may have been a case that the courts recognized such seizure 
as lawful after the Second World War, even for the unlawful belligerent,37 
                                                                                                                      
34. The full details emerge from the hearings before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on 
Determining the Basis of the Contemplated Return to Hungary of Certain Horses Said to 
Have Been Brought to the United States as Captured War Matériel, Dec. 3–23, 1947 (1948). 
The total number of horses was higher than the one hundred or so Hungarian horses men-
tioned above. The details are to be found at page 12 of the Senate Hearings; see also Downey, 
Captured Enemy Property, supra note 21, at 497, 503–04; Bessenyey v. Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue, 45 T.C. 261 (1965); ELIZABETH LETTS, THE PERFECT HORSE: THE DARING 
US MISSION TO RESCUE THE PRICELESS STALLIONS KIDNAPPED BY THE NAZIS ch. 27 
(2016). 
35. Etat français v Etat Monmousseau, 37 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
PRIVÉ 311–15 (1948). 
36. Herbert Smith, Booty of War, 23 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 227, 
233 (1946) (“in this case both the manufactured cigars and the leaf were clearly booty of 
war”); Downey, Captured Enemy Property, supra note 21. 
37. Richard Baxter, The Definition of War, 16 REVUE ÉGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNA-












there is a very good case that we should no longer consider that the law on 
such war booty is good law.38 The time has surely come to move beyond the 




Another familiar term related to wartime is “bounty.” This refers to the 
money paid to the officers and crew present on a warship successful in battle. 
It was calculated according to the number of enemy sailors on a warship that 
had been captured, burned, destroyed, or sunk (and in earlier times this in-
cluded “private ships of war” with letters of marque). Elaborate procedures 
                                                                                                                      
38. In Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Company and Republic of Iraq, 
[1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 25 (CA), Leggatt L.J. stated: “From earliest times the concept of plun-
der, booty and the spoils of war has been amongst the most basic. The seizure by one state 
of goods belonging to another represents an act of conversion as obvious as it is flagrant.” 
Such a seizure could be covered by war risks insurance, which covers seizure in this context 
as a Prize. See Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Kuwait Insurance Company, [1999] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 803, HL (per Lord Hobhouse). But the English courts would not recognize as legal 
the Iraqi seizure of the Kuwaiti planes on grounds of public policy: “Iraq’s invasion of Ku-
wait and seizure of its assets were a gross violation of established rules of international law 
of fundamental importance. . . . Such a fundamental breach of international law can properly 
cause the courts of this country to say that, like the confiscatory decree of the Nazi govern-
ment of Germany in 1941, a law depriving those whose property has been plundered of the 
ownership of their property in favour of the aggressor’s own citizens will not be enforced 
or recognised in proceedings in this country. Enforcement or recognition of this law would 
be manifestly contrary to the public policy of English law. . . . International law, for its part, 
recognises that a national court may properly decline to give effect to legislative and other 
acts of foreign states which are in violation of international law.” Kuwait Airways Corpora-
tion v. Iraqi Airways Company, [2002] UKHL 19 [29] (per Lord Nicholls). In this situation 
the illegality of Iraq’s action was also based on the binding nature of the relevant Security 
Council resolutions. 
39. See also the suggestion by Hersch Lauterpacht that “a state waging an unlawful war 
does not obtain or validly transmit title with respect to property acquired in connexion with 
the conduct of war regardless of whether such title is otherwise acquired in accordance with 
the law of war.” Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem with the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRITISH 
YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 360, 378 n.2 (1952); Baxter, supra note 37, at 9 n.38, 
claimed that Lauterpacht back-peddled from this view as a description of the actual law, 
referencing Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 BRITISH YEAR BOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 206, 233 (1953). To be clear, I am suggesting that today neither 
side ought to be able to permanently acquire booty of war, even if there is obviously a case 













determined what counted as evidence for calculating the number of person-
nel on board the sunken or captured ship.40 It has been said that bounty was 
intended to encourage “personal gallantry and enterprise.”41 
In the United States, this bounty money meant that the crew could ex-
pect, for a ship that had been destroyed or sunk, $100 per enemy sailor if the 
American naval power was superior, and $200 if the American force was 
smaller or equal to that of the enemy. For a captured warship ordered to be 
destroyed, the bounty was $50 per enemy head on board at the time of cap-
ture. Arnold Knauth provides some examples, such as the Battle of Manila 
Bay in 1898, where the American force won with superior armaments, lead-
ing to an award of $191,400 based on destroyed vessels that had 1,914 crew 
members.42 The admiral’s share in turn was 5 percent of the total, and the 
rest shared according to a scale fixed in prize law. The actual provision, 
which was abolished in 1899, gives us a flavor of the complexities of the 
reward structure, and reads in part: 
 
A bounty shall be paid by the United States for each person on board any 
ship or vessel of war belonging to an enemy at the commencement of an 
engagement, which is sunk or otherwise destroyed in such engagement by 
any ship or vessel belonging to the United States or which it may be nec-
essary to destroy in consequence of injuries sustained in action, of one hun-
dred dollars, if the enemy’s vessel was of inferior force, and of two hun-
dred-dollars, if of equal or superior force, to be divided among the officers 
and crew in the same manner as prize-money; . . . and there shall be paid 
as bounty to the captors of any vessel of war captured from an enemy, 
which they may be instructed to destroy, or which is immediately destroyed 
for the public interest, but not in consequence of injuries received in action, 
fifty dollars for every person who shall be on board at the time of such 
capture.43 
 
                                                                                                                      
40. For example, the numbers were in the first instance “proved by the oaths of three 
or more of the chief officers or men belonging to the said hostile ship or ships of war or 
privateers.” These oaths were to be sworn before a British mayor or, if in a neutral port, 
before a British consul or vice-consul. See THOMAS HORNE, COMPENDIUM OF THE STAT-
UTE LAWS, AND REGULATIONS OF THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY RELATIVE TO SHIPS OF 
WAR, PRIVATEERS, PRIZES, RE-CAPTURES, AND PRIZE MONEY ch. 7, at 89–90 (1803). 
41. ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 27. 
42. For further detail and examples, see Arnold Knauth, Prize Law Reconsidered, 46 CO-
LUMBIA LAW REVIEW 69, 70 (1946). 












In the United Kingdom, an equivalent provision provided for payment of 
£5 sterling and read as follows, until it was repealed in 1948: 
 
If, in relation to any war, Her Majesty is pleased to declare, by proclamation 
or Order in Council, Her intention to grant Prize bounty to the officers 
and crews of Her ships of war, then such of the officers and crew of any 
of Her Majesty’s ships of war as are actually present at the taking or de-
stroying of any armed ship of any of Her Majesty’s enemies shall be entitled 
to have distributed among them as Prize Bounty a sum calculated at the 
rate of five pounds for each person on board the enemy’s ship at the be-
ginning of the engagement.44  
 
Awards during the First World War to British Naval Service personnel ran 
to quite large sums, which could be the equivalent of three years’ salary for 
an able seaman.45 In the absence of hard evidence, the awards of bounty 
handled by the courts would sometimes estimate upwards the number of 
enemy crew on a destroyed battleship.46 
While such bounty or “head money” is no longer paid under the U.S. or 
UK legislation, and no other States are known to have awarded such 
bounty,47 the implications for the development of naval warfare may have 
                                                                                                                      
44. Naval Prize Act 1864, 27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, § 42 (1864), repealed by the Prize Act 
1948, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 9, § 9(2) (1948). 
45. For some detail of head money of £5 a head paid in 1916 to British submarine crew, 
see IAIN BALLANTYNE, THE DEADLY TRADE: THE COMPLETE HISTORY OF SUBMARINE 
WARFARE FROM ARCHIMEDES TO THE PRESENT 115 (2018), where it is recorded that the 
crew of the B11 received £3,500, meaning that an able seaman, after deduction of the prize 
agent’s fee and apportionment, would receive “£120 6s 1d. the equivalent of three years’ 
pay.” For the detail of some of the bounty money awarded during the First World War, see 
THE THIRD GREAT WAR NUMBER OF THE FLEET ANNUAL AND NAVAL YEAR BOOK 71 
(1917), https://archive.org/details/fleetannualnaval00coveuoft. 
46. The crew of the B11 benefitted from Sir Samuel Evans rounding up the size of the 
crew on the enemy battleship to seven hundred. In his award of July 24, 1916, Sir Evans 
stated “I declare the officers and crew of submarine B 11 are entitled to prize bounty as 
being the only vessel present that brought about the destruction of the Turkish battleship 
‘Mesudieh,’ and I think I am justified in adding a percentage to the complement ordinarily 
carried by that battleship. I declare the number on board to be 700. Nobody can say I am 
wrong, and I hope I am right. The prize bounty awarded will be £3,500.” THE THIRD 
GREAT WAR NUMBER OF THE FLEET ANNUAL AND NAVAL YEAR BOOK supra note 45, at 
16. 
47. See ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 57. For the history of bounty, see id. at 27–39. For 












been quite far-ranging. Seen from the perspective of incentives, some schol-
ars have speculated that the system of rewards might have meant that com-
manders selected their battles and the way they fought in order to maximize 
not just bounty, but also the prize money that would be shared according to 
the values of the captured ship and cargo. Prize money (as opposed to “head 
money” or bounty) was calculated according to the value of the warship, 
merchant ship, and relevant cargo. Restraint in attack in order to ensure a 
more valuable prize could explain some tactics in limited wars until prize 
money was no longer distributed between the capturing State and the naval 
personnel. Douglas Allen’s study of incentives in the British Navy in the 
eighteenth century age of sail highlights how such rewards were essential not 
only for the lower ranks, but also for admirals. “At a time when an admiral 
of the fleet might earn £3,000 per year, some admirals amassed £300,000.”48 




In addition to the Belligerent’s Right to capture and keep enemy property, 
such as warships (booty of war), maritime warfare has traditionally included 
a Belligerent Right to capture enemy merchant (civilian) ships and aircraft. 
Property passes to the capturing State after adjudication by a prize court. The 
origins of the idea of prize law are related to the idea of seizing enemy prop-
erty; as James Kraska explains, the “English word ‘prize’ or French ‘prise’ is 
derived from the Latin verb ‘prehendere,’ which means to seize.”49 Grotius 
opined in his Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (1603) that the idea of 
seizing and acquiring enemy property goes to the very purpose and rationale 
of just war: 
 
But war is just for the very reason that it tends toward the attainment of 
rights; and in seizing prize or booty, we are attaining through war that 
which is rightfully ours. Consequently, I believe those authorities to be en-
tirely correct who hold that the essential characteristic of just wars consists 
above all in the fact that the things captured in such wars become the prop-
erty of the captors: a conclusion borne out both by the German word for 
war, [krieg from Middle High German kriec(g), which means “exertion,” 
                                                                                                                      
48. Douglas Iain Allen, The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the 
Age of Fighting Sail, 39 EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 204, 213 (2002). 
49. James Kraska, Prize Law, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF PUBLIC INTERNA-












“endeavour to obtain something,”] and by the Greek word for Mars, since 
Ἄρης, [“Ares,” i.e., “Mars,”] is apparently ἀπὸ του̑ αἴρειν, “derived from 
ἀείρειν,” [which means “to take away,” “to seize”]. Therefore, the seizure 
of spoils of war is necessarily just on some occasions; and furthermore, it 
must be just in regard to the same persons and by that same criterion of all 
law, embraced in our demonstration of the justice of war.50 
 
A. Reprisals, Letters of Marque, Prize, and the Distribution of Prize Money 
 
One way into understanding prize law is to consider and contrast the history 
of reprisals. In the Middle Ages reprisals were the chosen method for right-
ing a wrong done to a national by a foreigner or foreign government. As 
Stephen Neff explains: “When a person was injured by a foreigner and was 
unable for some good reason, to obtain compensation from the very person 
who committed the wrong, satisfaction could be had, as a last resort, by seiz-
ing property belonging to any fellow-national of the wrong-doer.”51  
The victim would need a “letter of reprisal” from their sovereign and, 
should the reprisal be effected against innocent fellow nationals, they would, 
in theory, be “entitled to be indemnified by the original wrongdoer.”52 These 
private or particular wars look more like law enforcement until they relate to 
action abroad. At this point they start to look more like war, and the letters 
were known as “letters of marque,” letters of reprisal being considered an 
authorization to seize goods within the jurisdiction, whereas letters of 
marque “permitted such capture beyond the borders.”53 Only the letters of 
marque separated these authorized privateers from pirates whose acts would 
be illegal. The logic of these private wars is found in just war doctrine and 
the justifications given for Wars between sovereigns. Nevertheless, the sep-
arate institution of prize law developed in time of War meant that enemy 
                                                                                                                      
50. GROTIUS, COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY 68–69 (Martine Julia 
van Ittersum ed., Gwladys Williams & Walter Zeydel trans., Liberty Fund 2005) (1603) 
(footnotes omitted; editor’s brackets in original). 
51. STEPHEN NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 77 (2005). 
52. Id. at 78. 
53. HORNE supra note 40, at 2, where the footnote reads, “The term marque is derived 
from the antiquated word marche, denoting a boundary or limit.” See also NEFF, WAR AND 
THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 51, at 81 (“This expression apparently derives from the 
German word Mark, meaning frontier, referring to the right to take action beyond the fron-
tier of the issuing state.”). See further, for other suggestions of the relevance of the term 
marque, based on the Latin marchare—to seize as a pledge—Grover Clark, The English Prac-












property and enemy vessels on the high seas could be captured and con-
demned through adjudication by a prize court. The captured property might 
also include enemy goods on neutral vessels, neutral goods on enemy vessels, 
contraband of war, or vessels caught breaching a Blockade. 
The prize was claimed as a sovereign right of a belligerent State at War. 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, some saw this as a universally 
accepted right that flowed from sovereignty and the need to acquire such 
property in time of war. The issue was no longer the recuperation of what 
had been wrongfully taken (reprisal) but a Belligerent Right based on ancient 
practice to take and keep all such foreign property captured on the high seas 
in time of War. Any connection to a just war cause was by this time severed. 
As Sir William Scott (later Lord Sewell), sitting as a judge in prize court, 
explained in an 1804 judgment: “The right of making war and peace is ex-
clusively in the Crown. The acquisitions of war belong to the Crown; and 
the disposal of these acquisitions may be of the utmost importance for the 
purposes of both war and peace.”54 
The value of the ship and the cargo taken in War was divided between 
the State (the Crown) and the crew and officers of the relevant authorized 
ships.55 As with bounty (or prize bounty), there were complex rules that ap-
plied to the distribution of prize money with regard to the value of the cap-
tured ship. For the United States: 
 
The net proceeds of all property condemned as prize, shall, when the prize 
was of superior or equal force to the vessel or vessels making the capture, 
be decreed to the captors; and when of inferior force, one-half shall be 
decreed to the United States and the other half to the captors, except that 
in case of privateers and letters of marque, the whole shall be decreed to 
                                                                                                                      
54. The Elebe, Dec. 19, 1804, reprinted in 1 REPORTS OF PRIZE CASES: 1745 TO 1859, at 
447 (E. S. Roscoe ed., 1905); see also WILLIAM HAZLITT & HENRY ROCHE, A MANUAL OF 
THE LAW OF MARITIME WARFARE 374 (1854). 
55. Articles of Agreement would set out the division of prize between the owner of the 
ship and the captain, officers, and crew. For example, for the Mars in New York (1762), the 
owner was to get half, the other half to be divided between the captain (6 shares), lieutenants 
and master (3 shares), captain’s clerk, mates, steward, prize-master, gunner, boatswain, car-
penter and cooper (2 shares), their mates (1½ shares), doctor (3 shares) and the rest of the 
company deemed able seamen (1 share). JOHN JAMESON, PRIVATEERING AND PIRACY IN 












the captors, unless it shall be otherwise provided in the commissions issued 
to such vessels.56 
 
The British rules on distribution have been traced back to 1511, early in 
the reign of Henry VIII, when, for one expedition, prizes were divided be-
tween the King and the admiral. The rules reached a consolidated form un-
der Queen Anne, in 1708, when prizes were transferred completely to the 
captors (with nothing left to the sovereign). Those rules can be summarized 
as providing for a captain “actually on board at the time of the prize” to be 
allowed three-eighths; lieutenants one-eighth; gunners, carpenters, surgeons 
and chaplains one-eighth; gunner’s mates, surgeon’s mates, etc., one-eighth; 
trumpeters, barbers, cooks, etc., two-eighths.57 
Today, prize in the United States, or in the United Kingdom, would be-
long exclusively to the State, but in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
the sums that would accrue to the officers or crew could be enormous. The 
record sum probably goes to the 1762 capture of the Spanish frigate Hermi-
one, loaded with treasure, which led to each seaman getting £485, a sum 
which would perhaps be worth close to £100,000 in 2021. The captains re-
ceived around £65,000 each, a sum equivalent to around £13,000,000 to-
day.58 One can see why the State had an interest in ensuring that it got its fair 
share of the proceeds through careful application of the law in prize courts. 
The prize courts also operated as courts applying international law (the Law 
of Nations) and/or national law, to protect the rights of those who risked 
having their property seized and eventually condemned.59 
The rules relating to the character of the goods that could be captured 
were set out as far back as the thirteenth century in well-known books for 
traders, such as the Consolat de Mar (originally in Catalan), and in the following 
                                                                                                                      
56. See 54 Rev. Stat. § 4630 (1873). For an overview of the distribution in the British, 
Italian, Russian, and French systems, see ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 54–57. 
57. For the Cruizers Act 1708 and the proclamation issued by the Queen following the 
statute, see ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 6–7. 
58. For further details, see Action of 31 May 1762, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/Action_of_31_May_1762; and for the salaries at the time, see Naval Warfare 
Officer’s Association, Pirates and the Way to Fame and Fortune, ENGAGE! (Sept. 2013), 
http://warfareofficers.org.au/members/engage/2013-September.pdf. 
59. For a full explanation, see JAN HENDRIK VERZIJL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: PART IX-C THE LAW OF MARITIME PRIZE (1992). For the con-
troversy as to whether prize courts really apply only international law, or are in the end 











centuries from the British Navy’s perspective in the Black Book of the Admi-
ralty (in ancient French). According to the Consolat de Mar, property belonging 
to enemies on neutral ships could be captured by a belligerent State in time 
of War, while it was prohibited to capture neutral property when capturing 
an enemy ship. Not all States respected this rule and various powers came to 
different arrangements for different Wars. In the run-up to the Crimean War, 
Sweden and Denmark declared their neutral status and sought exemption 
from capture of enemy goods on neutral vessels. In turn the British and 
French, who were joining the War against Russia on the side of Turkey, 
agreed to such a waiver of rights. In the words of the British Declaration of 
War on Russia, “Her Majesty is willing, for the present, to waive a part of 
the belligerent rights appertaining to Her by the law of nations. . . . Her Maj-
esty will waive the right of seizing enemy’s property laden on board a neutral 
vessel, unless it be contraband of war.”60 
Following the 1856 Congress of Paris, which brought the Crimean War 
to an end, the participants adopted the Declaration of Paris (as a legally bind-
ing treaty) and, in an early commitment to multilateralism, opened the treaty 
up to States that were not at the Congress. This treaty stated that it was pro-
hibited to capture two categories of non-contraband goods: enemy goods on 
neutral ships; and neutral goods on enemy ships.61 
But even after the 1856 Paris Declaration offered protection for neutral 
goods and ships, there was still unease with the idea that the fact of a War 
(in the technical legal sense) could allow a State (with the requisite naval ca-
pacity) to seize and capture enemy goods on enemy ships on the high seas. 
Not only were such goods seized along with the ships, but through the in-
stitution of prize courts, the seizing State could acquire property rights over 
such goods and a title to such goods valid against the whole world. While 
there might once have been some strategic rationale for cutting off trade 
from the enemy State, including food and other goods, over time, with the 
                                                                                                                      
60. Declaration, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, Mar. 28, 1854, at 1008. 
61. Declaration of Paris, Apr. 16, 1856, 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW SUPPLEMENT 89–90 (1907). Article 2 states, “The neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, 
with the exception of contraband of war”; Article 3: “Neutral goods, with the exception of 
contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy’s flag.” See Hisakazu Fujita, Com-
mentary to the 1856 Paris Declaration, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 66–75 (Natelino Ronz-
itti ed., 1988); although some may not have considered that this sort of exception from 
capture should apply beyond the States parties (see FRANCIS PIGGOTT, THE DECLARATION 
OF PARIS (1919)), the Declaration is today widely seen as reflecting customary international 












advent of new forms of transport (railways meant that many ports were no 
longer dependent on ships for supplies), such seizures started to look more 
like benefitting from the fortunes or spoils of war—in other words, another 
form of war booty (even if not falling into that technical category under most 
definitions). 
A joint resolution of the U.S. Congress in 1904 stated:  
 
it is desirable, in the interest of uniformity of action by the maritime states 
in the world in time of war, that the President endeavor to bring about an 
understanding among the principal maritime powers with a view of incor-
porating into the permanent law of civilized nations the principle of the 
exemption of all private property at sea, not contraband of war, from cap-
ture or destruction by belligerents.62 
 
This was not the first time the United States sought to swim against the tide 
of allowing rights of capture of private enemy property. Already in its 1785 
treaty with Prussia, it protected private trading vessels from interference or 
capture on the high seas, but, as Jan Hendrik Verzijl’s historical accounts 
show, subsequent attempts by the United States and others, such as France, 
Italy, Austria, Prussia, China, and the Institut de droit international, all failed 
to enshrine a lasting ban on capture of private property at sea.63 In Paris, the 
United States proposed to abolish privateering in return for a new rule that 
the private property of the subjects of a belligerent power should not be 
seized by the other belligerent unless it be contraband.64 The U.S. case was 
that “The prevalence of Christianity and the progress of civilization have 
greatly mitigated the severity of the ancient mode of prosecuting hostilities. 
War is now an affair of Governments.” And so it was argued that there was 
a received rule, 
 
at least as operations upon land are concerned, that the persons and effects 
of non-combatants are to be respected. The wanton pillage or uncompen-
sated appropriation of individual property by an army, even in possession 
of an enemy’s country, is against the usage of modern times. Such a mode 
                                                                                                                      
62. 33 Stat. 592 (1904). 
63. VERZIJL ET AL., supra note 59, at 275–79. See also Verzijl’s examination of the In-
stitut’s texts from the meetings in the Hague (1875), Zurich (1877), and Turin (1882), which 
were, as he explains, all “in favour of the abolition of the capture and confiscation of private 
enemy property in naval war.” Id. at 278. 












of proceeding at this day would be condemned by the enlightened judg-
ment of the world, unless warranted by special circumstances. Every con-
sideration which upholds this sentiment in regard to the conduct of a war 
on land favours the application of the same rule to the persons and prop-
erty of citizens of the belligerents found upon the ocean.65 
 
This was not acceptable to the other States in Paris, or when proposed 
in a new treaty the following year. Rear Admiral Charles Stockton, writing in 
retirement, explains how the newly elected President Buchanan suspended 
negotiations on this issue for the entire period of his administration, leaving 
the issue for President Lincoln to find in this “unsettled state.”66 Neverthe-
less, in the American Civil War, both the North and the South formally ap-
proved the rules prohibiting the seizing of enemy property on neutral ships 
and neutral property on enemy ships, in their relations with neutral shipping 
from France and Great Britain.67 
A subsequent American proposal to the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, 
which would have demanded respect for enemy property on the high seas, 
attracted twenty-one votes, with eleven votes against, eleven not responding, 
and one abstention. To pass the proposal would have required twenty-three 
votes among the forty-four participating States.68 The United States unsuc-
cessfully invoked the following ideas in favor of abolition of the right to 
                                                                                                                      
65. Note from William L. Marcy, U.S. Secretary of State, to Count Sartiges (July 28, 
1856), in PIGGOTT, supra note 61, at 397. 
66. Charles Stockton, The Declaration of Paris, 14 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
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capture enemy property on the high seas: there was minimal military ad-
vantage to be gained by capturing enemy goods; reasons of humanity; and 
the existing prohibition of pillage in land warfare.69 
The British delegation had instructions to support such an initiative, as 
the government appreciated that changing the rules to grant immunity to 
enemy merchant ships and property at sea would possibly benefit Great Brit-
ain, restrain acts of war, and diminish expenditure on arms. The government 
also considered that, logically, immunity for merchant ships would involve 
“the abolition of the right of commercial blockade.” Bearing in mind that 
the government considered at that time that “[t]he British navy is the only 
offensive weapon which Great Britain has against Continental Powers,” the 
government was clear that it did not authorize the delegation to “agree to 
any Resolution which would diminish the effective means which the navy 
has of bringing pressure to bear upon an enemy.”70 Naval powers were, in 
the end, unwilling to abolish their acquired Belligerent Rights.  
One has to ask whether such rights for States can continue to exist today. 
Mainstream opinion suggests that they can. Military manuals state that a bel-
ligerent State is entitled to capture and confiscate enemy goods on enemy 
ships along with the ships, as well as enemy aircraft with enemy goods.71 Title 
will pass following condemnation by a prize court after it is determined that 
the capture is “good prize.”72  
Rather than suggesting that such Belligerent Rights apply in all armed 
conflicts, we should accept that they can no longer be upheld in the face of 
States’ obligations under the UN Charter. A State should no longer be able 
                                                                                                                      
69. Id. at 101. The rhetorical point that capture of enemy property at sea is essentially 
piracy was similarly unpersuasive; the Colombian delegate, Triana, reportedly said that war 
was organized murder. JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PART II WAR 311 n.1 
(1907). The Belgian and Brazilian proposal that the conference should adopt a voeu (rec-
ommendation) that the property should be returned after the War was similarly unsuccess-
ful. Id. at 314. 
70. The full instructions are reproduced in ALEXANDER PEARCE HIGGINS, THE 
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES 614–25 (1909) (the quotations are taken from paragraphs 
18–20). 
71. Capture must take place outside neutral waters or airspace. See, e.g., UK MANUAL, 
supra note 13, ¶¶ 12.91–12.96, 13.99–13.104; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 9, ¶¶ 135–145. 
72. The procedural rules for the standing of an enemy alien before a prize court vary 
from State to State, and justice would clearly demand that the prize court should be able to 
hear the point of view of the enemy whose property has been captured. C. JOHN COLOM-












to seize and confiscate a foreigner’s private property, whether or not there is 
a Declaration of War, and whether or not it sets up a prize court. 
Although the British and Germans resorted to capture and prize during 
both World Wars, the United States, despite passing a series of laws, has not 
used prize law since around 1903. Congress abolished bounty and prize 
money in 1899. The French law from 1939 regulating maritime prize was 
updated in 2014 and now excludes enemy warships seized during hostili-
ties.73 The remaining prize jurisdiction over other ships and their cargo 
would require a State of War (état de guerre).74 Interestingly, merchant ships 
and their goods captured by the French maritime armed forces, if con-
demned in the Conseil des prises, would be divided among all the armed 
forces taking part (including the army and air force). One quarter would go 
to the captors or their heirs, and three-quarters to the treasury of the French 
State. The captors’ share would in turn be divided among the officers and 
crew, one-quarter going to the officers and three-quarters to the crew, ac-
cording to weighted percentages, with vice admirals getting twice as much as 
commanders, and first mates getting four times more than sailors. The rele-
vant rank is the rank at the time of capture.75 
 
B. Contraband of War as Prize 
 
A further aspect of prize law relates to the law on contraband of war. This 
meant that belligerent States considered they had Belligerent Rights to stop 
and search neutral ships for contraband (certain goods destined for use by 
the enemy). There were eventually attempts to distinguish between the Bel-
ligerent Rights applicable to absolute contraband (e.g., arms and ammuni-
tion) and conditional contraband (e.g., food and provisions destined for the 
                                                                                                                      
73. Décret-loi du 1er septembre 1939 relatif aux prises maritimes, as amended. 
74. I am extremely grateful to Commissaire-Général Jean-Louis Fillon for guiding me 
though the French legislation. He concludes, “L’application de la législation des prises relève 
bien d’un cadre juridique différent, celui du temps de guerre qui dans notre droit constitu-
tionnel reste formellement marqué par la déclaration de guerre.” See Jean-Louis Fillon, A 
propos du Conseil des prises et de la déclaration de la guerre: Etude sur l’obsolescence du droit de la guerre 
navale, REVUE MARITIME 516, at 126, 133 (Mar. 2020). A key text is the Ministerial Instruc-
tion No. 2380/EMM/2 (Dec. 31, 1964), on the Application of International Law in the 
Event of War (l’instruction sur l’application du droit international en cas de guerre) (last 
amended in 1969). 












army).76 The concept of “continuous voyage” meant that even goods to be 
unloaded in a neutral port could be condemned in prize if they were ulti-
mately destined for the enemy.77 
Today, the law states that neutral ships carrying contraband can be cap-
tured outside neutral waters.78 Contraband has been defined in the San Remo 
Manual (1994) as “goods which are ultimately destined for territory under the 
control of the enemy and which may be susceptible for use in armed con-
flict.”79 And the Manual states that in order for there to be a right of capture 
for the contraband goods or neutral vessels, the belligerent must have pub-




                                                                                                                      
76. The London Declaration, supra note 9, arts. 22–44. This distinction is no longer 
deemed particularly relevant, as today States would draw up specific lists of contraband; see 
SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 9, ¶¶ 147–150. 
77. See Christian Schaller, Contraband, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 14 (updated Sept. 2015), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/la 
w:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e276?rskey=nbtHLD&result=1&prd=MPIL; 
The London Declaration, supra note 9, art. 30. For the legal effects on British subjects, see 
Proclamation of King George V (Aug. 5, 1914), reprinted in ARTHUR CLEMENTS & HENRY 
WATERSON, COMMERCIAL LAW IN WAR TIME: A BOOK FOR BUSINESS MEN 67 (1914). As 
explained in chapter 5 of ANDREW CLAPHAM, WAR (2021), the definition of “alien enemy” 
under English law is not solely related to a person’s nationality but rather connected to their 
“war domicil.” See ARTHUR PAGE, WAR AND ALIEN ENEMIES: THE LAW AFFECTING THEIR 
PERSONAL AND TRADING RIGHTS, AND HEREIN OF CONTRABAND OF WAR AND THE CAP-
TURE OF PRIZES AT SEA 4–7 (2d ed. 1915).  
78. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 9, ¶ 146. 
79. Id. ¶ 148. 
80. Id. ¶149. The MANUAL seems to draw a distinction between capture and condem-
nation in this context. See id. at 213–14. Whether the goods or vessels can actually be con-
demned in this context by a prize court is not certain. See 2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A TREATISE, supra note 27, ch. 5. Views differ on the relevance of the knowledge of 
the master or the owner of the character of the cargo as contraband and of the outbreak of 
war. This idea, which centers on the “state of mind of the neutral claimant,” can be traced 
back to the time when carrying contraband in breach of neutrality was a crime. See COLOM-
BOS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIZE supra note 72, ch. 5. Today it is difficult to see why 
neutral vessels or the goods they are carrying should be condemned in a punitive way either 
for carrying contraband, or for unneutral service. But see HARVARD MANUAL ON AIR WAR-
FARE, supra note 9, at 348–53, which assumes that neutral airplanes and their cargo can be 












C. Attacks on Merchant Vessels 
 
Merchant ships flying the flag of the enemy and their enemy cargo have been 
captured, diverted, or, in exceptional circumstances, destroyed.81 The prop-
erty passed to the capturing State following adjudication by a prize court of 
the capturing State (all efforts to have an international prize court have been 
stalled since the non-entry into force of the Hague Convention XII (1907)). 
Resisting visit, search, and capture meant a merchant ship could be attacked. 
Captured vessels could be destroyed in cases of military necessity. Even the 
civilian crew on board could be interned as prisoners of war, in part to fore-
stall their future use as sailors in the navy.82 Some vessels, such as hospital 
ships and small fishing boats, are exempt from capture under certain condi-
tions.83 
More generally in this context, the purpose of sea warfare became, in 
Oppenheim’s words, “annihilation of the enemy merchant fleet.”84 It was the 
nature of the World Wars that explains the erosion, or absence, of rules that 
protected merchant shipping. This particularly applied to submarine warfare 
against merchant shipping. The war logic in part is that merchant ships, their 
civilian crews, and indeed all enemy vessels, including private yachts, etc., are 
presumed to be potentially part of the enemy’s naval fleet.85 The institution 
of War meant that captures could be made even after the end of hostilities, 
as long as there was a formal State of War.86 Moreover, in the World Wars 
                                                                                                                      
81. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 9, ¶¶ 135–140. For an early work highlighting some 
of the practice and controversies, see FREDERICK SMITH, THE DESTRUCTION OF MER-
CHANT SHIPS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1917).  
82. See Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A)(5), 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, and, for the “more favourable treatment” 
referred to there, see Convention No. XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to 
the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War arts. 5, 6, Oct 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2396, 
T.S. No. 544 [hereinafter Hague Convention XI] (Article 6: “The captain, officers, and 
members of the crew, when nationals of the enemy State, are not made prisoners of war, 
on condition that they make a formal promise in writing, not to undertake, while hostilities 
last, any service connected with the operations of the war.”). 
83. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 9, ¶¶ 136, 137; see also Hague Convention XI, supra 
note 82. 
84. 2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, supra note 27, at 458. 
85. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 14, at 551–52. 
86. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg makes the point that the confiscation of private 
property in War continues even after an armistice. Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, 












the belligerent States assumed control over merchant vessels to the extent 
that they were seen as naval auxiliaries.87 
 
The two World Wars were total or “totalitarian” wars. They came to in-
volve almost all the Powers and all, or almost all, of their populations and 
resources so that each of them strained every resource to ensure victory. 
As the contest increased in intensity, resort was made to additional and 
more ruthless means and methods of fighting as the conflict escalated. . . . 
For each side, the war was, in a very real sense, “to the death,” and because 
more and more of each nation’s resources were sucked into the fight, the 
escalation became a function of each side’s desperation.88 
 
Despite this history of unrestricted attacks on merchant shipping in sit-
uations of total war, as well as the more recent practice in the Iran–Iraq War, 
the fundamental rules that determine if and when a merchant ship has be-
come a military objective remain in force. Today, such targeting rules must 
not depart from the established rule requiring that in order for objects to be 
attacked they must be military objectives, “which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”89 As we shall see, 
retaining the rules on search, capture, and blockade engenders further rules 
on resistance to capture and breach of blockade, which in turn lead to a 
claimed right to attack such merchant ships.90 
 
                                                                                                                      
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 283, 305 (1992); see also COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OF THE SEA, supra note 14, at 548 (“The outbreak of war immediately confers on a belliger-
ent the right to seize and confiscate enemy merchant vessels on all areas of the sea outside 
neutral territorial waters.”). 
87. “In a general war, the true merchant vessel is rarely to be found because the bellig-
erent states normally assume such a degree of control over their own vessels and neutral 
vessels engaged in trading with them as to convert them into de facto naval auxiliaries. As 
de facto naval auxiliaries, they should be subject to the same treatment as de jure naval 
auxiliaries, that is, they may be sunk on sight outside of neutral waters.” Fenrick, supra note 
8, at 253. 
88. Louis Goldie, Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping: An Overview of Law and Practice, 65 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1, 19 (1993).  
89. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 9, ¶ 40. 












D. Modern Prize Court Legislation 
 
In the interests of clarity, it is worth explaining at this point that a significant 
stream of the commentary in English has distinguished “capture” from “sei-
zure.”91 Capture is used to denote that full legal ownership passes to the State 
taking control. This is said to be the case for enemy warships or other enemy 
ships employed in public service.92 Captured warships would more properly 
therefore be considered booty of war, and were included in prize court ju-
risdiction “for the purpose of prize money only [bounty], as property passes 
immediately on capture.”93 Strictly speaking, then, these sorts of captures do 
not form part of contemporary prize law, as they are not adjudicated and 
condemned through prize courts.94 “Seizure” refers to the situation where 
the act does not transfer legal ownership; this happens only after adjudica-
tion and condemnation by a prize court. The international usage today is, 
however, not consistent, so the terms in this article have had to be used 
somewhat interchangeably. 
The “Law of Prize” (as already explained, from the French “prise” mean-
ing “seize”), comprises rules that were central to the laws of war and were 
administered by national courts, under which vessels, aircraft, and goods 
were seized and then liable to be condemned by the national prize court of 
the captor State, with the result that the title to property would pass to the 
captor Belligerent State if the seizure was a good prize.95 The most recent 
entry on the “Law of Prize” in Halsbury’s Laws of England seems to assume a 
State of War: 
 
Capture is lawful from the outbreak of war, the exact moment of which is 
usually stated in the declaration of war by the belligerent power, until the 
                                                                                                                      
91. See SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA, supra note 11, at 93–94. 
92. Id. at 94; compare the definitions of capture and seizure given in INSTITUTE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE GOVERNING THE RELATIONS BE-
TWEEN BELLIGERENTS (1913) (OXFORD MANUAL OF NAVAL WARFARE), reprinted in THE 
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 1123 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004). 
93. COLOMBOS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIZE, supra note 72, at 51. 
94. Capture with immediate transfer of ownership and without reference to prize court 
is said to apply to enemy and neutral merchant vessels and aircraft that have become military 
objectives. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 9, at 187. 
95. For a study on the law applied by a wide variety of States and the implications for 
international law, see LUIGI SICO, TOUTE PRISE DOIT ÊTRE JUGÉE: IL GUIDIZIO DELLE 












final termination of the war, which is not necessarily synonymous with the 
total cessation of hostilities unless accompanied by a declaration on the 
part of the victorious power that the war is ended.96  
 
Indeed, when writing about prize law commentators often reference 
wars and warfare, but some will imply that prize law can apply beyond de-
clared War to international armed conflicts more generally (even though all 
commentators exclude its application to non-international armed con-
flicts).97 
India, however, in reaction to the establishment of prize courts by Paki-
stan in 1965, argued not only that prize courts could only be established in 
the context of a declared War,98 but that as War was now banned under the 
UN Charter, so too must prize courts now be illegal: 
 
[P]rize court action is contrary to the international law as at present estab-
lished under the regime of the United Nations Charter. It is well known 
that the United Nations Charter has banned war and no country can, there-
fore, legally declare a war. Without such declaration of war, prize court 
                                                                                                                      
96. 85 Halsbury’s Laws of England ¶ 609 (2012) (footnotes omitted). 
97. See Kraska, supra note 49, ¶ 1 (“In modern usage the term ‘prize’ means a ship or 
property captured at sea under the laws of war. A prize is a legal capture at sea during war-
time. The concept of prize law arose in customary international law in connection with the 
seizure at sea of enemy property in naval warfare, which may include ships and cargo at sea 
during times of international armed conflict.”). See also HARVARD MANUAL ON AIR WAR-
FARE, supra note 9, at 338 (“There is no concept of prize law in non-international armed 
conflict”). For the law of prize is said to be “applicable in international armed conflict only.” 
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockades and Interdictions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 925, 940 (Marc Weller ed., 2015). See also 
Hans-Georg Dederer, Enemy Property, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (updated Sept. 2015), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/97 
80199231690/law-9780199231690-e294?rskey=2nmnuI&result=1&prd=MPIL, who con-
templates the use of prize law for enemy merchant ships and enemy property, but confines 
the term enemy to international armed conflict, while non-international armed conflicts in-
volve adversaries rather than enemies. 
98. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture in Naval Warfare: 
Part II, Developments since 1945, 30 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 96 
(1992), explains that Pakistan exercised prize court jurisdiction over fifty ships and their 
cargoes (mostly consisting of tea belonging to Indian owners or British corporations). India 
protested the seizure of Indian cargo on neutral ships, “asserting that the laws of prize can 












action is illegal. If any country declares a war, it establishes its naked ag-
gression. In the circumstances, contraband control and prize court action 
stand illegal.99 
 
The Indian Naval and Aircraft Prize Act, 1971, in an apparent change of 
approach, now specifies that India’s prize court has “exclusive jurisdiction 
in respect of each prize and each proceeding for the condemnation of prop-
erty as prize, whether such prize is taken before or after the commencement 
of this Act.”100 Jurisdiction also extends to all ships, aircraft, cargo, etc., “as 
may be captured or seized as prize during a war or as a measure of reprisal 
during an armed conflict or in the exercise of the right of self-defence.”101 
When asked in Parliament why India had not passed similar legislation in 
1965, the minister responded that no goods had been captured on the high 
seas.102 The measure was welcomed by one member of parliament, “as we 
are certain that we are going to have a rich haul of enemy property.”103 In 
the brief debate on the legislation, members of parliament referred to “a state 
of belligerency at the outbreak of war,” “powers with whom we are in a state 
of belligerency,” “a state of belligerency and hostility,” and of the need to 
check neutral ships when “we are at war with Pakistan.”104 One member of 
parliament urged the government that, “having been fortified with this law, 
they should at no cost return the enemy property captured by us during this 
war with Pakistan.” He continued, “I have referred to this in particular be-
cause we cannot afford to commit the same mistake again.”105 The minister 
responded to a number of points, explaining that property belonging to the 
State of Pakistan would not be subjected to the prize courts but would be 
                                                                                                                      
99. Statement of March 26, 1966, quoted in ARNOLD MCNAIR & ARTHUR WATTS, THE 
LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 457 (4th ed. 1966). They state that “the Government of India 
announced that cargoes detained in India and belonging to third countries would be re-
turned to them.” Id. The Indian Ministry of Defence’s official HISTORY OF THE INDO-PAK 
WAR, 1965, ch. 10, at 284 (1992) suggests that plans were made to seize Pakistani merchant 
ships but not to sink them. 
100. Naval and Aircraft Prize Act, 1971, § 4(1), No. 59, Acts of Parliament, 1971 (India). 
The section goes on to outline the conditions for bringing the prize within the jurisdiction 
of the prize court. 
101. Id. § 4(3). 
102. Shri Vidya Charan Shukla, Parliamentary Debates, Dec. 15, 1971, Fifth Series, vol. 
XX, no. 24, col. 70. 
103. Shri Somnath Chatterjee, id. at cols. 60–61. 
104. Parliamentary Debates, supra note 102, at cols. 61, 62, 64, 66. 












simply captured as booty of war;106 the legislation was said to be primarily 
aimed at contraband on neutral ships headed to Pakistan. 
In the 1971 conflict with Pakistan (which is said to have been considered 
a War by the parties and the United States107), India captured four Pakistani 
navy vessels (ships of war), a number of Pakistani merchant ships, declared 
a blockade of eastern Pakistan, published lists of contraband (as did Paki-
stan) and adjudicated contraband cargo unloaded from Danish ships.108 It 
seems likely that Indian prize court jurisdiction would only cover declared 
War and international armed conflicts of a certain duration, and would apply 
the customary international rules on prize.109 
A more recent example of prize court legislation is that of Iran, which 
sought to condemn, through a prize court, property seized in its conflict with 
Iraq. Although this court never came into effect, it is interesting that Iran 
would have authorized acquisition of property from “States at war” with Iran 
under Article 3(a) of the 1987 Iranian law regarding “war prizes,” thus limit-
ing enemy property taken as prize to property owned by States. Certain other 
property, including that owned by nationals of the enemy State, would be 
confiscated as war contraband involving, under Article 3(b), a contribution 
to the combat power of the enemy. This last category is said to be intended 
to go beyond the idea of absolute contraband and reflect the practice of Iran 
of seizing “any merchandize benefitting the war effort of the enemy, either 
directly or indirectly.”110 For the property of enemy States at War with Iran, 
and objects that Iran had forbidden to be transported to enemy territory, the 
confiscation could, according to this law, have taken place without the inter-
vention of a judge.111 
The Iranian “Law Regarding the Settlement of Disputes over War 
Prizes,” ratified by the Constitutional Council on January 31, 1988, to apply 
as an experiment for five years, included the following provisions: 
 
                                                                                                                      
106. See Naval and Aircraft Prize Act, 1971, supra note 100, § 12 (“Prize proceedings 
not to apply to enemy warships and military aircraft.”). 
107. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Introductory Report I, in VISIT, SEARCH, DIVER-
SION AND CAPTURE: THE EFFECT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ON THE LAW OF 
NAVAL WARFARE 1, 56 (Wolf Heintschel von Heinegg ed., 1995). 
108. Id.; Goel, Comment No 4, in id. at 103–06. 
109. See Naval and Aircraft Prize Act, 1971, supra note 100, § 4(4). 
110. See the explanation in Djamchid Momtaz, Iran, in THE IRAN–IRAQ WAR (1980–
1988) AND THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 19, 26 (Andrea de Guttry & Natalino Ronzitti 
eds., 1993). 











Article 3: According to this law, the following goods, merchandise and 
means of transport shall be considered as war prizes: 
(a)  All goods, merchandise, means of transport and equipment belonging 
to a State or to States at war with the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
(b)  Merchandise and means of transport in paragraph (a) belonging to 
neutral States or their nationals, or to nationals of the belligerent State if 
they could effectively contribute to increasing the combat power of the 
enemy or their final destination, either directly or via intermediaries, is a 
State at war with the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
(c)  Vessels flying the flag of a neutral country as well as vehicles belonging 
to a neutral State transporting the items set out in this article. 
(d)  Merchandise, means of transport and equipment which the Islamic Re-
public of Iran forbids from being transported to enemy territory. 
  
Article 4: All goods, merchandise and means of transport indicated in par-
agraph (a) of Article 3 will become the property of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. All goods, merchandise and means of transport indicated in para-
graphs (b) and (c) of Article 3 will be confiscated by the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. . . . The means of transport indicated in par-
agraph (d) of Article 3 will become the property of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran or be confiscated according to circumstances. Any person contesting 
this must appear before the Tribunal.112  
 
This War Prizes Tribunal was premised, then, on the notion or fact of one 
or more States being in a State of War with Iran. The jurisdiction of the 
tribunal was dependent on the State of War. 
As we saw above, the UK and U.S. prize courts, for example, have been 
institutionalized as part of the national legal orders and, as with other States, 
are no longer required to be commissioned through an express instrument.113 
There have been no instances of American or British prize courts since the 
                                                                                                                      
112. Id. at 39–40. 
113. See further COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 14, at 
804, 812, for the United Kingdom and the United States. For brief references to France, 
Belgium, Italy, Germany, Japan, China, the USSR, Thailand, Austria, Turkey, Greece, Ro-
mania, the Netherlands, and Norway, see COLOMBOS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIZE 
supra note 72, at 36–47. For further detail, see Steven Haines & Craig Martin, Prize Courts: 
Their Continuing Relevance, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 267 (Dale Stephens & Matthew 
Stubbs eds., 2019). See also, for the prize court in the United Kingdom, 85 HALSBURY’S 












Second World War, leaving the situation a little uncertain. Certainly the fa-
mous judgments of the highest courts in these two States have historically 
conceived of the international law applied by prize courts as related to “acts 
done by the sovereign power in right of war;”114 “the acts of a belligerent 
Power in right of war;”115 “capture at sea during war;”116 “prize of war;”117 
and “the immunity of fishing boats in time of war.”118 So, while prize courts 
may now be established as temporarily dormant institutions, rather than cre-
ated for each and every War, it remains unclear whether national prize courts 
would operate outside a situation of a formal State of War. 
The practice in the United Kingdom has been for prize jurisdiction to be 
exercised following a special commission “upon the outbreak of every 
war.”119 The U.S. Code provides that the federal district courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over prize,120 and states that “This chapter applies to all cap-
tures of vessels as prize during war by authority of the United States or 
adopted and ratified by the President.”121 
In the context of the discussion over the legal consequences of a block-
ade of Cuba by the United States in 1961, it seems to have been assumed by 
the assistant attorney-general that captured ships accused of attempting to 
breach such a blockade “could be treated as prizes and placed within the 
prize jurisdiction of the federal district courts, provided the captures could 
be deemed to have been made ‘during war.’ ”122 
The idea of prize court jurisdiction is to ensure that the draconian rights 
of the belligerent State are not applied against totally innocent parties. A 
hearing before a prize court is a chance for the parties affected to claim that 
                                                                                                                      
114. The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77, 91 (PC). 
115. Id. at 92. 
116. Id. at 94. 
117. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 678 (1900). 
118. Id. at 702. 
119. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 14, at 804. 
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of 
the courts of the States, of: . . . Any prize brought into the United States and all proceedings 
for the condemnation of property taken as prize.”). 
121. 10 U.S.C. § 8851 (2018). 
122. Robert Kramer, Assistant Attorney-General, Office of Legal Counsel, Authority 
of the President to Blockade Cuba: Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General (Jan. 
25, 1961), in 1 SUPPLEMENTAL OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 195, 200 
(2013); see also Legal and Practical Consequence of a Blockade of Cuba: Memorandum (un-
signed) (Oct. 19, 1962), in 1 SUPPLEMENTAL OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUN-












the Belligerent Rights related to capture have been abused, and that the prop-
erty should not be condemned (and pass to the blockading State) but rather 
be restored to its owner. There may even be related issues concerning com-
pensation to the shipowners for visit, search, and seizure where such action 
could not be based on a reasonable belief on the part of the belligerent 
State.123 As we have seen, prize court jurisdiction has been asserted only very 
rarely since the Second World War, and some national legal orders probably 
require a Declaration of War before a prize court can sit. Wolff Heintschel 
von Heinegg is unequivocal that the law of prize is “applicable in interna-
tional armed conflict only.”124 
In the twentieth century, prize courts were commissioned against a back-
ground of Belligerent Rights in a State of War.125 Modern military and expert 
                                                                                                                      
123. For details of the different approaches of British and German prize courts with 
regard to the burden of proof on the award of damages where there was unfounded reason-
able suspicion on the side of the captor, see PHILIPP WENDEL, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
INTERFERENCES WITH THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
236 (2007); see also The London Declaration, supra note 9, art. 64; COLOMBOS, THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 14, at 775–825. 
124. Heintschel Von Heinegg, Blockades and Interdictions, supra note 97, at 940. 
125. The Security Council, with regard to Israel and Egypt in 1951, considered the 
Armistice Agreement to be of a “permanent character,” so that “neither party can reasona-
bly assert that it is actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search and 
seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence.” S.C. Res. 95 (Sept. 1, 1951). The most 
extensive debate on this topic took place in 1951 in the Security Council with regard to the 
claim of Egypt that it enjoyed Belligerent Rights under a state of War with Israel, notwith-
standing the armistice. The Security Council found that neither Israel nor Egypt was an 
active belligerent, and that neither of them could reasonably assert that they were required 
“to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence.” 
Id. While several Council members emphasized the permanent nature of the armistice, Israel 
also argued that “the claim to belligerency cannot be sustained by the United Nations.” 
Ambassador Eban of Israel continued, “The Charter has created a new world of interna-
tional relations within which the traditional ‘rights of war’ cannot be enthroned. It is no 
accident that belligerent rights have never been recognized or mentioned either by the Char-
ter or by any organ of the United Nations. Members of the United Nations are pledged to 
refrain entirely in their international relations from the threat or use of force, except on 
behalf of the purposes of the United Nations. There can therefore be no room within the 
régime of the Charter for any generic doctrine of belligerency, since belligerency is nothing 
but a political and legal formula for regulating the threat or use of force.” U.N. SCOR, 549th 
mtg. ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. S/PV.549 (July 26, 1951). See also the rest of the debate in S/PV.550-
553 and S/PV.555. Whether or not belligerent rights existed, several delegations would seem 
to limit them to rights that would be exercised in self-defense following an armed attack. 












manuals, however, assume that the armed forces can as a matter of extant 
international law capture and divert vessels for adjudication and condemna-
tion in prize court, whether or not they are dealing with a recognized State 
of War between two States or simply an international armed conflict.126 And 
yet the same manuals make no reference to the ways in which prize court 
jurisdiction is to be established, or the prospect that under national law today 




In order to avoid the legal consequences of a state of formal War, States in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries sought to portray their blockades of 
foreign ports as “pacific blockades.” Their argument was that the action (ar-
guably in reprisal) was only being taken against ships from the blockaded 
                                                                                                                      
State of War. See The Lea Lott, United Arab Republic, Prize Court, Dec. 16, 1959, 28 IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 652; The Esperia, United Arab Republic, Feb. 26, 1959, 28 
INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 656; The Fjeld, Egypt Prize Court of Alexandria, Nov. 4, 
1950, 17 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 345; The Flying Trader, Egypt, Prize Court of 
Alexandria, Dec. 2, 1950, 17 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 440. However, one prize court 
later additionally referred to the fact that the measures were only taken in areas of sovereign 
territory rather than under the “rules of war on the high seas,” and that, in any event, the 
Constantinople Treaty of 1888 “gives Egypt the right to take all necessary measures for the 
maintenance of public order in time of peace and for her defence in time of war.” The Inge 
Toft, United Arab Republic, Prize Court, Sept. 10, 1960, 31 INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS 
509, 518 (1966). 
126. See, e.g., U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-
14M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE 
LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ¶ 5.2 (2017); U.S. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 29, ¶ 
3.4.1.1; UK MANUAL, supra note 13, ¶ 12.78.1. Note that the 2007 amendments to the UK 
MANUAL delete the words “the United Kingdom has not used prize courts for many years 
and is unlikely to do so in the future.” See James Farrant, Modern Maritime Neutrality Law, 90 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 198, 305 (2014); Steven Haines, The United Kingdom’s Manual 
of the Law of Armed Conflict and the San Remo Manual: Maritime Rules Compared, 36 ISRAEL YEAR-
BOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 89, 100–01 (2006). In the Netherlands, Article 14 of the Prize 
Regulations states that “The Right of Capture may be exercised during the period in which 
the Netherlands is in a state of war or armed conflict with another Power.” Zeeman, The 
Netherlands, The Law of Neutrality, and Prize Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE NETHER-
LANDS 337, 361 (H.F. van Panhuys et al. eds., 1980). We will consider the recent use of prize 












State, which could be “seized and sequestrated but not condemned and con-
fiscated.”127 The ships of third States were free to pass through the blockade 
to the blockaded port.128 Where action was desired against neutral shipping, 
a pacific blockade would have to be converted into a Blockade proper, with 
an accompanying State of War. An act of blockade,129 whatever the intention, 
could become an act of War when either side considered the legal situation 
to be one of a State of War.130 
Generations of lawyers have studied the Prize Cases decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. This judgment concerned the Civil War between the North-
ern States loyal to the Union (the North) and the Confederate States (the 
South) that had broken away. In this situation, the U.S. Supreme Court con-
sidered that “The proclamation of blockade is itself official and conclusive 
evidence to the Court that a state of war existed which demanded and au-
thorized a recourse to such a measure under the circumstances peculiar to 
the case.”131 This was in a way a recognition of the Belligerency for the rebel 
forces of the Confederate States, creating an international armed conflict out 
                                                                                                                      
127. 2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, supra note 27, at 148. For 
examples of pacific blockade and the reactions of third States, which drew a distinction 
between the rights of States in pacific blockade and Blockade in a State of War, see id. at 
144–49. 
128. Heidelberg Resolution of the Institut de droit international, Déclaration concer-
nant le blocus en dehors de l’état de guerre ¶ 1 (1887). 
129. A blockade has been explained as “a belligerent operation to prevent vessels 
and/or aircraft of all nations, enemy and neutral, from entering or exiting specified ports, 
airports, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy nation. 
The purpose of establishing a blockade is to deny the enemy the use of enemy and neutral 
vessels or aircraft to transport personnel and goods to or from enemy territory.” Wolff 
Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ¶ 1 (updated Oct. 2015), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/97 
80199231690/law-9780199231690-e252?rskey=b6vYrm&result=1&prd=MPIL. I am us-
ing a capital “B” for Blockades to signify that these Blockades were recognized as part of a 
State of War in the technical sense, giving rise to Belligerent Rights for States. The capital 
letters signify that the International Law of War, in the technical sense of a State of War, 
gave rights to Belligerents in International Law. These rights were assumed to flow from 
International Law as such (or the Law of Nations) and not from national law or any partic-
ular treaty. 
130. See ARNOLD MCNAIR & ARTHUR WATTS, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 20 (4th 
ed. 1966), suggesting that pacific blockade “does not ipso facto give rise to a state of war, 
although even if the blockading State is acting sine animo beligerendi, it will amount to an 
act of force which the blockaded State may elect to regard as creating a state of war.”  












of a civil war, with the attendant rules that applied in time of War (for the 
belligerent parties and for States with neutral status). 
Today a series of questions arise that are not easily answered. First, can 
one institute a blockade without also accepting that one has created a State 
of War? And, second, in the absence of a recognition of Belligerency, is the 
declaration or establishment of a blockade, with the traditional associated 
rights and obligations, applicable to a non-international armed conflict? If 
so, does such an application of the law of blockade still imply a recognition 
of Belligerency, as it did at the time of the American Civil War? 
 
A. Is Blockade Limited to a State of War (in the Legal Sense)? 
 
The idea that today, maritime warfare rules related to blockade require a State 
of War has been rejected in broad terms by Heintschel von Heinegg: “The 
existence of a state of war is not a precondition for the legality of certain 
methods and means of warfare anymore.”132 At one level this seems sensible. 
After all, it ought to be possible to judge the legality of a blockade by the 
modern humanitarian law standards that relate to its effect on the civilian 
population, and not simply according to whether there is a War on or not. 
One might be able to determine the limits of this method of warfare using 
the customary principles applicable to warfare more generally, the distinction 
between civilian objects and military objectives, the prohibition on dispro-
portionate damage to the civilian population, and agree that there is a prohi-
bition on blockades when their sole purpose is “starving the civilian popula-
tion or denying it other objects essential for its survival.”133 More generally 
there is a prohibition of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare.134 
But, seen from another perspective, Blockade is inextricably associated 
with the old institution of War, and beyond the legality of the means and 
methods of warfare, the institution of Blockade is said to bring with it certain 
traditional customary rights for the Blockading State that affect the eco-
nomic rights of neutral and enemy nationals. These rights belonging to the 
                                                                                                                      
132. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Naval Blockade, 75 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 
203, 204 (2000). Similarly, see Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, supra note 129, ¶ 5; see also 
LESLIE GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 204–07 (3d ed. 2008); 
PHILIP DREW, THE LAW OF MARITIME BLOCKADE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (2017). 
133. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 9, ¶ 102. 
134. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 463, 532–38 (3d ed. 2013) (especially 
at 535, where he states that “If a blockade has the effect of starving the civilian population 











Blockading State are mostly unregulated by treaty and traditionally flow from 
being in a State of War. One has to ask, therefore, whether the rights of a 
Blockading State (as opposed to the obligations imposed by international 
humanitarian law) can continue with the withering away of the institution of 
War? 
At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, legal advisors within the U.S. 
administration studied the implications of declaring a Blockade of Cuba. The 
U.S. Law of War Manual quotes part of one unsigned memorandum:  
 
The declaration of a state of war was helpful in ascertaining the rights 
and obligations of neutrals in a given situation. Apart from this, however, 
it served little function. War itself, whatever its reason, was legal self-help, 
and so were lesser measures if such could be said to exist. Whether or not 
a nation declared a state of war it would be found by others to exist if that 
state were claiming rights, such as blockade, normally associated with 
war.135  
 
The memorandum goes on, however, to explain: “One could deduce a state 
of war from the existence of a blockade. And one could not conceptually 
claim rights of blockade without acknowledging its relationship to war.”136 
And then the unsigned memorandum states:  
 
I would recommend, therefore, that if we declare a blockade, we simply 
claim all the rights a blockading nation would have if a state of war existed. 
This clarifies our position sufficiently for legal purposes. A number of 
states will say this amounts to a declaration of war against Cuba, but that 
could scarcely be avoided under any circumstances.137  
 
The summary conclusion that heads the memorandum reads “a blockade 
could be regarded by Cuba and other Soviet Bloc nations as an act of war.”138 
A similar legal opinion from 1961 explained that prize courts could op-
erate to treat neutral ships breaching the blockade as prizes, “provided the 
                                                                                                                      
135. The U.S. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 29, ¶ 3.4.1.1 n.59, includes references 
to a legal opinion of October 19, 1962. This is an unsigned, unaddressed memorandum, 
titled “Legal and Practical Consequences of a Blockade of Cuba.” See supra note 122. 
136. Legal and Practical Consequence of a Blockade of Cuba, supra note 122, at 489. 
137. Id. at 489. 












captures could be deemed to have been made ‘during war.’ ”139 The opinion 
also stated, “In the absence of a state of war, it might also be possible for 
Cuban nationals to resort to our courts for the purpose of testing the legality 
of the blockade.”140 The United States ultimately instituted a “quarantine,” 
which only focused on certain goods; precisely, it seems, to avoid the legal 
implications that flow from Blockades being bound up with a State of War.141 
Traditionally, we find that the blockading State had, in the case of breach 
of Blockade, the right to seize vessels and goods from ships flying the flag 
of any State. The idea that neutral vessels can be seized in some circum-
stances, and that the property rights pass permanently to the seizing State 
(even an aggressor Blockading State), must lead us to question whether these 
days the formal institution of Blockade, with its attendant rights, can be es-
tablished without the formal State of War from which those rights flow. And 
even if one imagines such a formal State of War today, how can Blockade at 
the same time not only be considered an act of aggression under the UN 
Charter,142 and a crime of aggression under the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court,143 but also give rise to a UN Member State’s right to seize 
and permanently keep the property and vessels of neutrals? International law 
surely cannot outlaw such acts of war as aggression under the UN Charter, 
criminalize such acts of aggression for the leaders who ordered the blockade, 
and then reward the perpetrators by sanctioning that they may keep anything 
they seize while carrying out the international crime? 
Remarkably, the military manuals and expert textbooks that I have been 
able to consult seem untroubled by this contradiction. I suppose that the 
authors of such military manuals always consider themselves to be imposing 
Blockade for justified reasons, and are concerned to maintain the legitimacy 
of this method or tactic of warfare. The most recent Manual, published by 
                                                                                                                      
139. Kramer, supra note 122, at 200. 
140. Id. at 201.  
141. See further THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 126, ¶ 4.4.8 (Maritime 
Quarantine). For the international law on the quarantine, see Quincy Wright, The Cuban 
Quarantine, 57 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 546–65 (1963); see also Lar-
man Wilson, International Law and the United States Cuban Quarantine of 1962, 7 JOURNAL OF 
INTER-AMERICAN STUDIES 485–92 (1965). 
142. “The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another 
State” qualifies as an act of aggression. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, art. 3(c) 
(Dec. 14, 1974). 
143. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8bis (2)(c), July 17, 1998, 












New Zealand in 2019, comes closest perhaps to recognizing the modern ten-
sion. It states early on that “[a] blockade is an act of war”144 and that New 
Zealand “is unlikely to be enforcing a blockade other than as part of a coali-
tion operation.”145 But it goes on nevertheless to outline the rules for capture 
of ships breaching blockade, and for attacking ships resisting visit, search, or 
capture, and for confiscation of neutral property in the context of breach or 
attempted breach. And yet the hesitation is clear when the Manual later ad-
dresses the idea of exercising prize jurisdiction in order permanently to con-
fiscate ships or goods: “It is generally not now appropriate for a State to 
profit financially from the waging of armed conflict, although it will still wish 
to be compensated for its losses.”146 
There has also been some hesitation among other States over the idea 
that Blockade can simply be decoupled from the institution of War. This 
could be for either of two reasons. First, a non-belligerent State today may 
wish to avoid Belligerent Rights being exercised by the Blockading State over 
their ships and cargoes. Speaking about the UK government’s approach to 
the conflict between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s, Christopher Greenwood 
explained as follows: 
 
[T]he Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence recently have avoided any 
references to a war in the Gulf. Although originally British spokesmen 
talked about the United Kingdom being “neutral” in the “war” between 
Iraq and Iran, since 1986 the tone of statements has changed. Reference is 
made instead to an “armed conflict” in which Britain is “impartial.” This is 
more than just the British love of understatement. It represents, in part, an 
attempt to ensure that the law of blockade will not be applied to the detri-
ment of British shipping.147 
 
Second, it may be that States contemplating establishing a Blockade still 
see Blockade as associated with formal War and aggression. For them this 
                                                                                                                      
144. NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE, MANUAL OF ARMED FORCES LAW, supra note 
29, ¶ 10.5.1. 
145. Id. ¶ 10.5.2. 
146. Id. ¶ 10.6.16 n.126. 
147. He continued, “Whether it is right to assume that the law of blockade would be 
applicable in a state of war, and would not be applicable if the conflict was not recognized 
as war, remains a much more complicated question.” Christopher Greenwood, Remarks, 












means Blockade has to be justified under the UN Charter.148 Steven Haines, 
who was involved in the British Ministry of Defence discussions over the 
appropriateness of a Blockade of the Montenegrin port of Bar during the 
NATO armed conflict over Kosovo in 1999, recounts that there “was a 
marked reluctance on the part of many within NATO, first to admit that the 
Alliance was actually in a state of war with Serbia and second, that belligerent 
blockade was an acceptable way of controlling access to Bar.”149 Ian Speller, 
similarly, suggests that “In 1999 NATO was unwilling to declare a blockade 
of the port of Bar in Montenegro (during the Kosovo conflict), because it 
was not formally at war with Yugoslavia.”150 Ronzitti puts it slightly differ-
ently, explaining, “During the NATO intervention against the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia in 1999, the United States proposed the blockade of the 
port of Bar, but the proposal was not endorsed by France and Italy as they 
deemed it required authorization by the UN Security Council.”151 
The issue is that blockade is not just a method or tactic of warfare; block-
ade in itself has to be justified as compatible not only with humanitarian rules 
for the protection of the civilian population, but also with the UN Charter. 
So Greenwood, even though he considered the NATO aerial attacks legal 
and justified as a humanitarian intervention, considered that any naval block-
ade would still have to be judged against the claimed justification for what 
would otherwise be a breach of the rule in the UN Charter prohibiting the 
use of force.152 He is making an important point for the purposes of our 
present inquiry. He is saying that a State establishing a blockade only has 
rights over neutral shipping to the extent that these are necessary for its le-
gitimate purpose in resorting to force in the first place. 
                                                                                                                      
148. There were apparently internal British Government discussions on the decision 
not to declare War or impose a blockade (as it seemed to them that blockade could not be 
undertaken without War) in the context of the conflict with Argentina over the Falk-
lands/Malvinas; see TANISHA FAZAL, WARS OF LAW: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN 
THE REGULATION OF ARMED CONFLICT 103–07 (2018). 
149. Steven Haines, The United Kingdom’s Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict and the San 
Remo Manual: Maritime Rules Compared, 36 ISRAEL YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS 89, 108 
(2006). 
150. IAN SPELLER, UNDERSTANDING NAVAL WARFARE 138–39 (2d ed. 2019). 
151. Natalino Ronzitti, Naval Warfare, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 17 (updated June 2009), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/ 
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B. Do the Belligerent Rights in Blockade Apply Beyond Inter-State Armed Conflicts? 
 
Let us turn to the other question posed above: does the institution of Block-
ade apply where one or more of the parties is a non-state actor? Heintschel 
von Heinegg is again emphatic: “It is to be emphasized that blockade is a 
method of warfare recognized to apply in international armed conflicts 
only.”153 The U.S. Law of War Manual contains sections on the right to block-
ade, but defines blockade as applying only where one State blockades the 
port, coast, etc., of another State.154 The commentary to the Harvard Manual 
on Air Warfare is clear: “Aerial blockade is a method of warfare exclusively 
applicable in international armed conflicts.”155 
While some might consider that the international law on blockade im-
posed by Israel should give Israel Belligerent Rights in the context of Gaza, 
even if this were to be considered a non-international armed conflict,156 oth-
ers are just as adamant that no Belligerent Rights flow from such a blockade 
in a non-international armed conflict.157 
                                                                                                                      
153. Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, supra note 129, ¶ 25; see also Magne Frostad, 
Naval Blockade, 9 ARCTIC REVIEW ON LAW AND POLITICS 195, 200 (2018). 
154. U.S. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 29, ¶ 13.10 (“A blockade is an operation 
by a belligerent State to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of all States, enemy as well as neutral, 
from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, 
or under the control of an enemy belligerent State.”). 
155. HARVARD MANUAL ON AIR WARFARE, supra note 9, at 358. 
156. See 1 JACOB TURKEL ET AL., THE PUBLIC COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE MARI-
TIME INCIDENT OF 31 MAY 2010, at 45–49 (2011), https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/gen-
eralpage/downloads_eng1/en/ENG_turkel_eng_a.pdf (“the Commission would have 
considered applying the rules governing the imposition and enforcement of a naval blockade 
even if the conflict between Israel and the Gaza Strip had been classified as a non-interna-
tional armed conflict”). Id. at 49. See also James Farrant, The Gaza Flotilla Incident and the Mod-
ern Law of Blockade, 66 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 81, 94 (2013); Eran Shamir-Borer, 
The Revival of Prize Law—An Introduction to the Summary of Recent Cases of the Prize Court in Israel, 
50 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 349, 362–66 (2020); Jeff Lahav, Summary of Recent 
Cases of the Prize Court in Israel, 50 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 373, 418–41 
(2020) (summarizing the Haifa maritime court case of The State of Israel v. The Ship Marianne). 
157. See TURKISH NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, REPORT ON THE ISRAELI AT-
TACK ON THE HUMANITARIAN AID CONVOY TO GAZA ON 31 MAY 2010, at 61–63 (2011), 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Turkish%20Report%20Final%20-%20UN%20Copy.pdf; 
Russell Buchan, The Palmer Report and the Legality of Israel’s Naval Blockade of Gaza, 61 INTER-












No State is likely to accept that a non-State actor involved in blocking 
access to its own ports can assert legal rights over any shipping, whether 
flagged by that blockaded State or by neutral States.158 The Tallinn expert 
manual on cyber operations is clear: “Non-state actors are not entitled to 
establish and enforce a naval, aerial, or a fortiori, cyber blockade.”159 On re-
flection, therefore, there seems little room for extending the Belligerent 
Rights associated with Blockade to non-international armed conflicts.160 This 
conclusion is further supported by the absence of any State seeking to apply 
the law of Blockade to the control measures taken off the coast of Yemen, 
notwithstanding that the action is popularly referred to as the blockade of 
Yemen.161 
It is true that the international community of States came to accept that 
the traditional Belligerent Rights associated with naval Blockade in a formal 
War between States meant there would be interference with neutral shipping 
and their right to trade. But there is no evidence that States have accepted 
that neutral shipping can be interfered with, or that global trade (unrelated 
to supplies directly related to the conflict) can be blocked as a result of a 
                                                                                                                      
158. HARVARD MANUAL ON AIR WARFARE, supra note 9, at 358; Ronzitti, The Crisis of 
the Traditional Law Regulating International Armed Conflict at Sea and the Need for Revision, supra 
note 7, at 12–13. 
159. See also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER OPERATIONS 507 (Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed., 2017).  
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however, that the humanitarian law that protects civilian populations from the effects of a 
naval or aerial action designed to cut off trade from the port or coast is not relevant, as we 
shall see below. Whether or not the action qualifies as a blockade under international law 
should not affect the question whether the effects of the action can be judged for compli-
ance with humanitarian law rules concerning starvation and disproportionate damage for 
the civilian population. 
161. For the conclusion that there can be no legal application of the Belligerent Rights 
of States related to Blockade in this non-international armed conflict, see Martin Fink, Naval 
Blockade and the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen, 64 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW RE-












State’s declaring a blockade in its non-international armed conflict with a 
non-state actor.162 Of course a State is entitled to restrict access to its own 
territory at any time, including during a non-international armed conflict, and 
a State may have claims related to self-defense against foreign shipping under 
the UN Charter, but these rights do not flow from the legal institution of 
Blockade.163 
 
C. The Impact of Blockade 
 
It is often suggested that blockade (even if it is not a proper Blockade in legal 
terms) has become to be seen as “a blunt instrument,” which “can have an 
impact on the innocent as much (often rather more) than enemy belliger-
ents.”164 It was estimated that around 763,000 wartime deaths could be at-
tributed to the “five-year economic strangulation” of Germany during the 
First World War.165 Philip Drew points out that the “Hunger Blockade” of 
Germany “was responsible for the deaths of more German civilians than was 
the Allied strategic bombing campaign of World War II.”166 
Blockade is often presented as just another method of warfare. But, like 
siege on land, it has often been aimed at deliberately creating suffering.167 As 
Yoram Dinstein explained:  
                                                                                                                      
162. Douglas Guilfoyle, The Mavi Marmara Incident and Blockade in Armed Conflict, 81 
BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171, 191–194 (2011). But see his tentative 
suggestion: “On the basis of relevant state practice one can at most hazard a suggestion that 
irrespective of the precise classification of a conflict, states are likely to tolerate the assertion 
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standing of war.” Id. at 194. 
163. Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockades and Interdictions, supra note 97, at 931–32, 939–
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164. SPELLER, supra note 150, at 139. 
165. Philip Drew, Can We Starve the Civilians? Exploring the Dichotomy between the Traditional 
Law of Maritime Blockade and Humanitarian Initiatives, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 302, 
309 n.34 (2019). 
166. Id. 
167. One legitimate aim of a siege is said to be to limit supplies reaching enemy forces 
in order to force the enemy to surrender. See Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Sieges, the Law and 
Protecting Civilians, CHATHAM HOUSE BRIEFING (June 27, 2019), https://www.chatham-
house.org/2019/06/sieges-law-and-protecting-civilians. International humanitarian law 
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civilians as a method of warfare, as well as, as we saw above, disproportionate incidental 
effects on the civilian population. See also U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human 













A blockade applies even to cargoes destined for the civilian population, and 
should this population be dependent on the importation of foodstuffs for 
its survival, the blockade may utilize the populace’s suffering as a lever to 
pressure the enemy into surrender.168 
 
Recent practice, with regard to the conflict in Yemen, has resulted in the 
conclusion by the UN Group of Eminent Experts that the proportionality 
rule, usually associated with attacks, can apply to the effects of a blockade, 
or a similar action, whether it can be called a Blockade under international 
law or not. They “find persuasive the argument for a broader interpretation 
of ‘attacks,’ where the requisite violence for an attack can be found in the 
consequences of an operation.”169 They went on to find that the effects of 
the embargo/blockade could not be justified: 
 
No possible military advantage could justify such sustained and extreme 
suffering by millions of people. When the coalition was able to assess that 
the naval restrictions were causing harm to the civilian population that was 
                                                                                                                      
(Jan. 2017), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.in 
fo/files/documents/files/sieges_legal_note_-_final_-_en_1.pdf. 
168. Yoram Dinstein, Sea Warfare, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
201, 204 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1982). 
169. Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses since September 2014, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/39/43, at 29 (Aug. 17, 2018); see also DREW, supra note 132, ch. 7. The Ger-
man Navy Handbook states: “A blockade must never be devoted to the sole objective of 
starving the civilian population or depriving it of vital items (prohibition of the so-called 
hunger blockade). A blockade is also inadmissible, if it is certain or to be anticipated that 
the negative effect on the civilian population is out of all proportion to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated.” GERMAN NAVY, SM 3, COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK: 
LEGAL BASES FOR THE OPERATIONS OF NAVAL FORCES ¶ 298 (2002). In an extensive arti-
cle Tom Dannenbaum takes a look at blockade against the modern law of armed conflict 
and concludes at one point: “It is difficult to imagine a blockade that would fail the sole 
purpose test.” Tom Dannenbaum, Encirclement, Deprivation, and Humanity: Revising the San 
Remo Manual Provisions on Blockade, 97 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 307, 335 (2021). He 
also states “Blockades are clearly a method of warfare. They are also, however, almost inev-
itably indiscriminate.” Id. at 339 n.154. He also makes the important point that “the extraor-
dinary scale of both the civilian loss expected in a blockade (including, potentially, mass 
starvation) and the military advantage anticipated from it (including, potentially, total victory 
in the war) would bear no relation to the scale of those factors in ordinary targeting opera-
tions, where iterated practice has arguably established some rough sense of how to appraise 












excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military ad-
vantage of those restrictions, the coalition was required by law to cancel or 
suspend those restrictions. It has failed to do so.170 
 
D. The Israeli Prize Court Adjudication over the Protest Ships attempting to Reach 
Gaza 
 
In the twenty-first century, Israel has exercised prize court jurisdiction and 
condemned two ships captured while they were engaged in protesting the 
blockade of Gaza.171 The court ordered that the proceeds of the sale of the 
ships (one under Swedish flag and the other flagged in the Netherlands) be 
transferred to the State of Israel.172 An earlier case concerned the Estelle, a 
Swedish-owned, Finnish-flagged ship, which had sailed from Finland and 
was said to have been attempting to breach the naval blockade of Gaza. The 
Haifa Maritime Court and the Israeli Supreme Court found that the State of 
Israel had initiated prize proceedings ten months after seizure, that this delay 
exceeded the accepted international norms in this area, and that the State 
had not contacted the owners or responded to their inquiries, and thus the 
State of Israel had, through these failures, deprived the owners of their right 
to submit their claims. The Supreme Court therefore ordered the release of 
the Estelle and for Israel to pay the ship’s costs.173 
                                                                                                                      
170. Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 169, at 32. 
If a State were to impose a blockade in an international armed conflict without Security 
Council authorization, the effect of the blockade would also have to comply with the ne-
cessity and proportionality requirements of self-defense under the U.N. Charter. See Green-
wood, The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Neutrality to the Kosovo 
Campaign, supra note 152, at 55–57; Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockades and Interdictions, supra 
note 97, at 931. 
171. According to a newspaper report, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs pro-
tested its view of the incident to Israel. The report states that only the flag State can interfere 
with a ship in international waters. Ship to Gaza: Sex släppta, ÖSTERBOTTENS TIDNING (June 
30, 2015). 
172. Lahav, supra note 156, at 418–41 (especially at 441, summarizing the Haifa mari-
time court case of The State of Israel v. The Ship Marianne, Case No. 7961-07-05), 441-47 
(especially at 447, summarizing The State of Israel v. The Ship Zaytouna-Oliva, Case No. 
19424-10-16). 
173. State of Israel v. the Ship Estelle, Original Petition, Claim in Rem 26861-08-13, 
Israel Haifa District Court, (Aug. 31, 2014), reprinted in 2014 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DO-
MESTIC COURTS 2299 (2014). For commentary in English, see Ruth Levush, Israel: Supreme 












The two Israeli judgments in the case of the Estelle were the first to grap-
ple with the question of whether such a prize jurisdiction actually existed as 
a matter of Israeli law. It was argued that the prize jurisdiction for Israel 
applied due to the extension of the UK Naval Prize Act 1864 to Palestine 
through the UK Prize Act 1939, with the associated Supreme Court of Pal-
estine (Prize) Order in Council of 1939 (which vested prize court authority 
in the High Commissioner)174 and the UK’s Order in Council of 1939 De-
claring War that we looked at above. Such a prize jurisdiction was originally 
dependent on a Declaration of War (in this case the United Kingdom’s 1939 
Declaration of War on Germany). The district court heard from Israel that 
it now had an independent power to continue this prize jurisdiction and that 
the blockade of Gaza should allow not only for seizure, but also for confis-
cation. According to the 2014 judgment in the Haifa District Court: 
 
The State did not present a proclamation about the outbreak of war as it 
ostensibly was required for the establishment of the authority according to 
the King’s Order of 1939, but argues that there is no need for such a proc-
lamation. The state believes that the King’s Order does not depend on the 
authority of a future publication of a proclamation, but rather on the dec-
laration of war, which, as we know, broke out shortly before the publica-
tion of the King’s Order (the outbreak of World War II on 9/1939). The 
State also contends that with the establishment of the State and the publi-
cation of the Order of Government and Law Ordinance, 5748-1948, there 
is no longer a need to obtain the approval or authorization of the Secretary 
of the British King and that all the powers have been transferred to the 
State of Israel. Lastly, it was claimed, that there is no need to proclaim a 
war for the purpose of starting the procedure of confiscating a ship, it is 
enough that an armed conflict exist, and the existence of such a conflict is 
not disputed.175 
 
                                                                                                                      
(Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/israel-supreme-court-or-
ders-release-of-ship-captured-attempting-to-break-gaza-blockade/. For a detailed comment 
by the lawyers for the ship, see John Harris & Yoav Harris, The “Awakening” of the English 
Naval Prize Act 1864—By the Haifa Maritime Court, https://shiparrested.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2015/11/The-Awekening-of-the-Prize-Court.pdf [last visited Sept. 3, 2021]. 
174. See also Supreme Court of Palestine (Prize) Order 1939, No. 1137, Sept. 2, 1939, 2 
Statutory Rules and Orders 2906-07 (1939); UK Prize Act 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6 c. 65, § 2(1) 
(1939). 
175. State of Israel v. the Ship Estelle, ¶ 31, reprinted in 2014 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 












In the Supreme Court we find a similar statement that “[t]he existence of a 
state of war or at least an armed conflict between Israel and the residents of 
the Gaza Strip is not controversial.”176 The Maritime Court and the Supreme 
Court on appeal nevertheless ordered the release of the Estelle due to the 
delay of ten months in initiating the prize proceeding. 
The Israeli judges determined that no link to the 1939 Declaration of 
War was necessary. This was because they found the authority of the prize 
court established by the British King at the outbreak of the Second World 
War had been bestowed on the State of Israel. The lower court found it had 
jurisdiction to operate as a prize court and authority to interpret the Naval 
Prize Act of 1864 and the 1939 Regulations;177 and, as we saw, it referenced 
the existence of a state of war, or at least an armed conflict, between Israel 
and the residents of Gaza. In a concurring opinion in the Supreme Court, 
Justice Meltzer stated that the Minister of Defence’s declaration of the Gaza 
blockade “renewed the continuum (even if severed) and is sufficient for our 
needs.”178 
Although the Haifa court determined that it could operate as a prize 
court under Israeli law, for all three ships it stressed the need for legislation, 
stating that “leaving such an important chapter as far as maritime laws and 
prize laws practically hidden from the public’s view is contrary to the princi-
ple of legality.”179 The judges were also aware that it is not clear how a con-
temporary application of prize law could be squared with expectations of 
protection of individual and property rights as well as freedom of naviga-
tion.180 In the subsequent rulings the court applied a series of considerations 
that were not derived from the ancient law of Blockade. The court stated 
                                                                                                                      
176. See id. (where the Supreme Court refers to its holdings in HC 769/02, Public Com-
mittee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [6] (2003) and HCJ 201/09 Physi-
cians for Human Rights v. Prime Minister [1] (2009)). 
177. Lahav, supra note 156, at 396. 
178. Id. at 416. 
179. Id. at 397. 
180. State of Israel v. the Ship Estelle, Original Petition, ¶ 46, reprinted in 2014 INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS 2299 (citing Eliav Lieblich, Yet Another Front in Is-
rael/Palestine Lawfare—International Prize Law, OPINIOJURIS (Jan. 13, 2014), http://opinioju-
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that it would examine, inter alia, “whether the ship itself or its cargo is in-
tended to be used or can be used as part of the enemy combat equipment” 
and “whether there is an affinity between the shipowner and the activity in-
tended to violate the blockade and consider whether this affiliation is suffi-
cient to justify the expropriation of property.”181  
In the two later cases of the protest ships in the maritime court, such 
considerations did not, however, prove an obstacle to condemnation. The 
court also considered its condemnation as justified when weighed against the 
right to protest. According to the summary of the judgment in State of Israel 
v. The Marianne: 
 
The flotilla organizers, including the shipowners and the STG [Ship to 
Gaza] organization, which includes the current flotilla organizers, have a 
right to protest and protest Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip, anywhere 
and in any other legal way. However, the attempt to violate the naval block-
ade as a means of protest violates the public interest and harms the purpose 
of imposing the blockade and, in particular, the purpose of weakening Ha-
mas in the Gaza Strip. The entrance of ships for the purpose of protest will 
encourage the population, strengthen the power of Hamas and damage the 
blockade objectives.  
In these circumstances, where the purpose of the ship’s journey is 
merely a protest, and when it is proven that the ship was on its way to 
violate the blockade, the State of Israel was entitled to seize it and there is 
cause to order the condemnation of the ship.182  
 
E. Final Thoughts on Blockade 
 
In concluding this section on blockade, we can welcome the important re-
strictions highlighted by the UN Group of Eminent Experts concerning the 
blockade of Yemen. But the existence of such protection does not resolve 
the tension that we find with the rights of neutral shipping, encountered in 
the most recent cases concerning Gaza. Under the traditional idea of Block-
ade, ships of all States (including neutral States) can be blocked from ap-
proaching or leaving the enemy coast or a part of it; and merchant vessels 
believed to be breaching a blockade can be seized along with their cargo. We 
have questioned whether this can still be correct. The San Remo Manual reit-
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erates the traditional Belligerent Right: “Merchant vessels believed on rea-
sonable grounds to be breaching a blockade may be captured. Merchant ves-
sels which, after prior warning, clearly resist capture may be attacked.”183 Ac-
cordingly, on this reading of the law, any ship in the world that is reasonably 
believed to be breaching the blockade can be captured and condemned in 
prize court, with the property title passing to the capturing blockading State. 
It is this last draconian set of Belligerent Rights relating to attack and confis-
cation that I would call into question.184 
With regard to seizure for breaching Blockade, the leading scholar in the 
field, Heintschel von Heinegg, has even raised doubts whether the old rule 
remains valid: 
 
Under the traditional law (Art 21 London Declaration of 1909) a vessel 
found guilty of breach of blockade may be condemned, ie, subject to the 
decision of a prize court, and property of the vessel or aircraft may be 
transferred to the capturing State. It is doubtful whether that rule continues 
to be valid today. In any event, the capturing State is entitled to repress the 
aircraft or vessel for the duration of the international armed conflict.185  
 
Other scholars have, at least since 1862, voiced doubts over whether a com-
mercial blockade should take priority over the rights of neutral States and 
their nationals.186 We have to conclude that there is real uncertainty over 
                                                                                                                      
183. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 9, ¶ 98. See also paragraph 67: “Merchant vessels 
flying the flag of neutral States may not be attacked unless they: (a) are believed on reason-
able grounds to be carrying contraband or breaching a blockade, and after prior warning 
they intentionally and clearly refuse to stop, or intentionally and clearly resist visit, search or 
capture.” 
184. The experts assembled in San Remo were apparently divided on the continuing 
existence of the international law related to blockade: “Although a minority believed that 
the traditional rules for formal blockade were in complete desuetude, a majority believed 
the occurrence of a number of incidents subsequent to the Second World War, in which 
States engaged in actions adopting some or all of the traditional rules of blockade, indicated 
that the doctrine still had utility as a coercive instrument.” SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 
9, at 176. 
185. Heintschel von Heinegg, Blockade, supra note 129, ¶ 41. In France, as we shall see 
below, it is uncertain how capture in blockade could be legalized in the absence of prize 
jurisdiction, which in turn requires a Declaration of War. See Jean-Louis Fillon, A propos du 
Conseil des prises et de la déclaration de la guerre: Etude sur l’obsolescence du droit de la guerre navale, 
REVUE MARITIME (Mar. 2020). 
186. See, e.g., JOHN MACQUEEN, CHIEF POINTS IN THE LAWS OF WAR AND NEUTRAL-












whether a State could, today, rely on traditional so-called “Belligerent 
Rights,” which belonged to a State at War, to seize and permanently confis-
cate neutral vessels in the context of breach of blockade.187 
 
VI. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
 
We should now draw a few conclusions with regard to the viability of this 
kind of economic warfare in the contemporary world. 
I have come to conclude that there is indeed, as Elihu Lauterpacht put 
it, “a genuine measure of absurdity in suggesting that a legal system which 
has excluded the right to have recourse to force should nonetheless permit 
the wrongdoer to assert belligerent rights arising out of his own wrongdo-
ing.”188 I think it would be better to deny States (whether engaged in an act 
of aggression or acting in self-defense) the traditional Belligerent Rights to 
acquire property rights against the civilian owners of ships, vessels, and air-
craft. In other words, we need to reconsider the traditional rule that is said 
to allow for any State at war with another State to capture and (following 
condemnation in the captor State’s own prize court) acquire title over pri-
vately-owned enemy merchant ships, enemy aircraft, and enemy goods on 
board either ships or planes.189 The rule seems even more ripe for review 
                                                                                                                      
be a hardship upon belligerents. But may it not be answered, that to continue blockades 
would be a greater hardship upon neutrals? Who are the most entitled to favour—the bulk 
of mankind, who are at peace, or the small, ill-conditioned portion who fight for an idea? 
Even supposing war to be a necessary evil, the struggle should be to make its mischiefs as 
small as possible to those not engaged in it.”). See also John Westlake, Note on Belligerent Rights 
at Sea, in ALMÁ LATIFI, EFFECTS OF WAR ON PROPERTY 152 (1909); WESTLAKE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: PART II WAR, supra note 69, at 164-69; but see Westlake’s second edition 
(1913) at 263 and chapter IX, and the discussion in 2 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
A TREATISE, supra note 27, at 770-75. 
187. See Andrea Gioia & Natalino Ronzitti, The Law of Neutrality: Third States’ Commercial 
Rights and Duties, in THE GULF WAR OF 1980–1988, at 221, 232–33 (Ige Dekker & Harry 
Post eds., 1992). Heintschel von Heinegg, while considering that a formal State of War is 
relevant neither for blockade nor for prize law, seems to accept that prize measures may not 
create permanently valid titles where the seizing State is acting beyond what is permitted by 
the necessities of self-defense. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Current State of Inter-
national Prize Law, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 5, 34 n.163 
(Harry Post ed., 1994). 
188. Elihu Lauterpacht, The Legal Irrelevance of the “State of War,” 62 PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 58, 63 (1968). 
189. See, e.g., OXFORD MANUAL OF NAVAL WAR, supra note 92, art. 33; SAN REMO 












when one remembers that the same manuals insist that such civilian ships 
and aircraft can be destroyed, having secured the safety of the passengers 
and crew, where “military circumstances preclude taking the aircraft [vessel] 
for prize adjudication.”190 How feasible will it be today for naval powers dur-
ing a war to bring a prize into their own ports for condemnation in prize 
court? Destruction will remain a very real option. 
Even if these traditional rules applied to both World Wars, and even if 
States might come to agree that the rules are different in a total war, today 
the idea that an aggressor State, in any international armed conflict, can seize 
and keep such property seems to contradict the modern law that prohibits 
recourse to war to settle disputes. The idea of a State’s claiming Belligerent 
Rights simply because it is at war seems completely at odds with the UN 
Charter and the prohibition of aggression. 
Any attempt, however, to reserve the right to seize private ships and air-
craft only to the State said to be acting in self-defense is doomed to failure. 
First, all States will claim they are acting in self-defense. Second, there is no 
overarching international umpire to determine which side started it. Prize 
courts may be applying some sort of international law, but they traditionally 
will not enter into who was the aggressor and who was the innocent party. 
In any event, as national courts they could not credibly make such a deter-
mination. 
Several authors have pointedly burst the fictitious bubble that suggests 
that prize courts simply apply the law of nations. Not only will a prize court 
ultimately have to follow rules or legislation laid down by its own govern-
ment, but where there are differences between different States on the sub-
stantive rules, one has to expect that prize court judges will be more likely to 
follow the local interpretation, especially where they are bound to do so by 
national precedent or legislation.191 The British concern over Russian prize 
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that “enemy outer space systems and assets” could be subject to capture as prize “in theory.” 
190. HARVARD MANUAL ON AIR WARFARE, supra note 9, r. 135; SAN REMO MANUAL, 
supra note 9, ¶¶ 139, 140. 
191. See JAMES BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 89–90 (5th ed. 1955). “But when we 
remember that the question upon which Lord Stowell was deciding concerned the resistance 
to visit and search by a British warship on the part of a Swedish ship sailing under convoy, 
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courts led to the proposal for an International Prize Court and the eventual 
adoption of Hague Convention XII (1907).192 But the failure to ratify the 
1909 London Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War (1909), which 
would have determined rules that such an international prize court would 
apply, meant that the court was never established. 
Given these problems, an alternative could be to say that because the 
defending State needs these Belligerent Rights, we have to be pragmatic and 
allow such rights to both sides. But even the defending State is limited as to 
how it can interfere with the rights of other States, bound as it is by the UN 
Charter’s limitations of proportionality and necessity. It is hard to see how 
those limits can be read as authorizing the permanent confiscation of for-
eigners’ property, in effect punishing individuals for the actions of their 
State.193 
We are left not only with considerable uncertainty concerning the appli-
cable treaty law on prize (all relevant treaties are strictly speaking dependent 
on a State of War, and mostly only applicable where all parties to the War 
are parties to the treaties),194 but also with no specialized international judicial 
or arbitral body to ensure the impartial application of this law beyond what 
is decided by national jurisdictions. It is suggested that rather than continuing 
to quest for an international jurisdiction to ensure an impartial application of 
                                                                                                                      
which he proposed to decide it himself.” Id. at 89. See also VERZIJL ET AL., supra note 59, at 
596–601; Note, The Case of the Zamora, 30 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 66 (1916); The Zamora 
[1916] 2 AC 77; David Foxton, International Law in Domestic Courts: Some Lessons from the Prize 
Court in the Great War, 73 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 261 (2002). 
192. Frits Kalshoven, Commentary to the 1909 Declaration, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WAR-
FARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 257, 257 
(Natalino Ronzitti ed., 1988). 
193. I am grateful to Sandesh Sivakumaran for these points. 
194. See, e.g., Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, 
15 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 791, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
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544; Convention No. XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval 
War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 545; Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 
20, 1928, 135 L.N.T.S. 187; Procès-Verbal: Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set 
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the rules, the uncertain nature of the rules themselves needs to be revisited 
to see if such rules should be upheld at all. The time has come to overhaul 
the presumptions that suggest a belligerent State can acquire through the law 
of prize (applied by its own courts) title to private enemy or neutral property. 
As a matter of treaty law, then, there seems to be no treaty authorization 
for the seizure of private enemy property, whether as a ship, an aircraft, or 
as enemy goods on board. The authority comes from the general assumption 
(including among most scholars) that these rules continue as a matter of cus-
tomary international law. The rules are detailed in expert manuals, alongside 
military manuals from powerful States, and they are usually stated to be a 
reflection of customary international law. Commentators such as Marco 
Sassòli come close to questioning the continuing validity of such rules by 
referring, in this context, to law from before the First World War that “al-
legedly still applies.”195 He also describes the rules as “outdated” due to the 
changes outlined above regarding the way goods are now shipped around 
the world, but also to “changes in moral perception.”196 
He is right. The rules (at least those relating to seizure, condemnation, 
and exceptional destruction of private enemy ships, planes, and goods197) 
must now be seen as not only outdated and unworkable, but also immoral, 
and moreover a sure way to undermine the distinction between military ob-
jectives and civilian objects. 
But denying these so-called “Belligerent Rights” to keep other people’s 
property need not leave States unable to defend themselves. Rather than see-
ing interception, search, and seizure as an economic warfare right undertaken 
to weaken the war-making capacity of the enemy, one can simply see them 
as related to the right to self-defense under the UN Charter.198 Seizing guns 
destined for the enemy could be excused as a proportionate and necessary 
measure of self-defense. But confiscating tea exports, or any ships seeking 
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197. The rules relating to seizure and condemnation of enemy merchant ships and neu-
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to trade by breaching blockade, widens the concept of war-like activity for 
both sides. This legitimization of economic warfare certainly risks blurring 
the distinction between civilian objects and military objectives, leading to a 
wider range of objects being considered to be engaged in war-sustaining ac-
tivity and perhaps turning them into apparent military objectives. 
Stripping away a customary international law right to confiscate on the 
high seas all enemy property and certain neutral property need not interfere 
with the right of a State to defend itself. The British chief naval judge advo-
cate, while not purporting to reflect the views of the Ministry of Defence, 
made a similar point when evaluating the state of the law in 1997: 
 
It is entirely possible that under the modern conditions of economic war-
fare at sea, depriving the enemy of the necessary arms and war materials is 
sufficient belligerent action, and the capture and condemnation, and thus 
benefit to the capturing belligerent, of the ship and/or cargo, is unneces-
sary in furthering that belligerent’s war aims. It would also obviate, it would 
seem, the necessity for establishing a Prize Court in accordance with the 
traditional law, and thus it may well be, if the law develops in this direction, 
that Prize Courts and Prize Law become obsolete.199  
 
This may seem radical, but in fact these belligerent rights have not been the 
subject of a prize court condemnation since the India–Pakistan conflicts in 
1965 and 1971. Specific national legislation was last adopted in the 1980s for 
the Iran–Iraq conflict, and even then the jurisdiction of the proposed “War 
Prizes Tribunal” was never actually established by Iran. 
Today we also have to counter the impracticality of applying many of 
these rules in the context of modern maritime commerce. Haines explains: 
 
Searching a container ship would be impossible. The characteristics of the 
majority of merchant ships today make it extremely difficult to divert them 
to convenient ports because few ports will be able to take them. This is 
especially the case with container vessels, which require specialist container 
terminals. It would also be difficult to put together a prize crew capable of 
operating a modern merchant vessel. It also seems most unlikely that the 
lawful destruction of very large container vessels on the high seas would 
                                                                                                                      
199. David Humphrey, Belligerent Interdiction of Neutral Shipping in International Armed Con-













be regarded as appropriate, either politically, or economically or environ-
mentally.200  
 
Let me now separate out suggestions for reform into questions of (a) 
seizure for breach of blockade; (b) visit, search, and seizure of neutral ships 
and goods in connection with breach of rules on contraband; and (c) the 
seizure of enemy merchant ships and enemy property at sea. 
 
A. Seizure for Breach of Blockade 
 
The modern expert manuals on conflict at sea and air warfare still reiterate 
that neutral merchant ships and aircraft are subject to seizure if caught 
breaching blockade.201 The ships and aircraft are then to be adjudicated in 
prize court and condemned—property titles passing to the captor State. For 
some time, leading experts have been tentatively expressing doubts as to the 
continuing validity or feasibility of maintaining the existence of such a right 
for States. In the words of Heintschel von Heinegg, “It is doubtful whether 
that rule continues to be valid today. In any event, the capturing State is 
entitled to repress the aircraft or vessel for the duration of the international 
armed conflict.”202 
                                                                                                                      
200. STUART CASEY-MASLEN & STEVEN HAINES, HAGUE LAW INTERPRETED: THE 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 306 (2018). The im-
practicality of searching for and distinguishing contraband from free goods was highlighted 
by Charles Stockton already in 1920: “This difficulty [of searching merchant vessels on the 
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I think it is indeed important to state clearly that this rule allowing for 
capture for breach of blockade should no longer apply.203 Obviously the ex-
ecution of such claimed Belligerent Rights can lead to international friction 
with States that are not parties to the conflict. More fundamentally, it is dif-
ficult to understand why the property rights of individuals and companies 
should be overridden because a State has decided to enforce a Blockade out-
side its territory. But beyond these traditional objections, I should like to 
highlight a few further reasons why the institution of Blockade should no 
longer give rise to a Belligerent Right to seize merchant ships or aircraft. 
The manuals (and here I am referring to the expert manuals on conflict 
at sea and air warfare, as well as the various military manuals published by 
States that address this issue) are explicit that a merchant vessel or aircraft 
(for aerial blockade) may be attacked if, after warning, it clearly resists cap-
ture or an order to land.204 Some States (such as Canada) may consider that 
breach of blockade is in itself a ground to attack such a vessel.205 Others (such 
as the United Kingdom and Germany) may consider that breach of blockade 
converts the merchant vessel into a military objective.206 Whichever way this 
is reasoned, the resulting deaths of civilians seem hard to justify as a general 
matter of morality, and attacks such as these would certainly undermine the 
general idea that civilians are immune from attack. 
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The right to capture a neutral vessel for breach of blockade is, then, in-
extricably bound up with a right to attack for resisting capture. It is also di-
rectly linked to the exceptional right to destroy such a captured ship “when 
military circumstances preclude taking or sending such a vessel for adjudica-
tion as an enemy prize.”207 So resisting capture can end in attack, and in some 
exceptional circumstances, even compliance with capture can result in de-
struction. Such destruction is supposed to take place only once the “safety 
of passengers and crew is provided for.”208 
When this rule on the permissible attacks on neutral vessels was being 
codified at the expert level in San Remo in 1994, there were some doubts as 
to why a neutral vessel could be attacked at all, considering that the Charter 
only allowed the use of force in self-defense,209 and the majority view was 
that “the definition of military objectives did not apply to the relationship 
between belligerents and neutrals.”210 Nevertheless, a group of participants 
felt that “States could not be expected to accept rules that would force them 
to lose the war.”211 So, in the end, the participants seemed to have relied on 
the idea that capture for breach of blockade was foreseen in the London 
Declaration of 1909, and the practice of attacking neutral shipping in both 
World Wars led to the formulation of a rule that neutral ships can be attacked 
for breach of blockade.212 
It seems the idea remains that if you want to strangle another State’s 
economy and deprive its people of imports and exports, attacking neutral 
ships under such circumstances is fair and just because States still have some 
sort of “right to win a war.” This to me makes no sense in a world where 
war has been outlawed. 
The reader may feel that this complex rulebook seems of little relevance 
today, with blockade a relative rarity and economic warfare at sea looking 
increasingly unlikely. Wars look more and more like counter-terrorism oper-
ations rather than the naval strategies of yesteryear. But the destruction of 
merchant shipping in the relatively recent “tanker war” between Iran and 
Iraq in the 1980s was considerable—by one estimate with over two hundred 
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mariners killed in attacks on over four hundred ships, thirty-one merchant 
ships sunk, with another fifty or so damaged as to be declared total losses.213 
This destruction and killing was not confined to rules concerning blockade, 
but related more generally to a disregard for the rules on distinction and a 
conflation of all the rules relating to economic warfare and merchant ship-
ping. 
In the end, the continuing idea that international law authorizes blockade 
with associated rights for States to engage in visitation, search, and seizure, 
as well as attacks for resistance, and, exceptionally, destruction, can only lead 
to confusion and the erosion of the rules designed to minimize the suffering 
and destruction in war. The apparent rules that allow for capture (and asso-
ciated attack and destruction) for breach of Blockade should be revisited to 
see if they can really still be applicable in the contemporary world. These 
rules are not contained in treaties but are derived from practices that have 
nothing to do with the humanitarian dimension that ought now to drive the 
development of the laws of war.214 Rather than allowing them to gradually 
slip away,215 a more concerted effort should be made to state clearly that 
international law no longer confers such Belligerent Rights on warring States. 
But of course, as stated in the introduction, this would mean a few powerful 
States having to accept that they may be giving away some rights that they 
might want to rely on later. 
 
B. Interference with Neutral Shipping and Seizure of Contraband Goods and Neutral 
Ships 
 
The point of a Belligerent Right to search neutral ships is to ascertain if there 
is contraband aboard. The idea of contraband was, however, expanded 
through extensive lists of items constituting contraband. Neff recounts how 
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France declared that rice destined for China would be considered contraband 
as it was so important for the Chinese in 1885, as otherwise France said they 
“would run ‘the risk of depriving themselves of one of the most powerful 
means of coercion.’ ”216 Contraband was also expanded, as we saw, through 
the use of the notion of “continuous voyage” and, lastly, through the idea of 
contraband infecting other goods on board so that the whole cargo and ship 
could be captured and condemned as prize.217 Even today, the San Remo Man-
ual foresees destruction in certain circumstances where the contraband is 
reckoned to form more than half the cargo.218 
The United Kingdom, in particular, has come in the last decades to focus 
on the rights of neutrals and no longer asserts Belligerent Rights against neu-
trals as it did in the past. In 1986, in the context of the Iran–Iraq war, the 
United Kingdom asserted that any Iranian right to stop and search was 
bounded by the right to self-defense.219 The idea that the international law 
relating to the use of force adds cumulative restrictions on top of those ob-
ligations found in the traditional law of naval warfare is now replicated in the 
UK Manual.220 A detailed study in 2010 suggested that when States came to 
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exercise rights of search of merchant shipping, they prioritized the interna-
tional law of self-defense as the justification rather than the traditional law 
of maritime warfare.221 Ronzitti now concludes that the practice is orientated 
towards reducing belligerents’ rights so that they conform to rights exercised 
in self-defense, and that only action compatible with the law on self-defense 
would be within the law.222 
At the opening of the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, the United King-
dom sought a new treaty that would abolish the principle of contraband, 
declaring:  
 
In order to diminish the difficulties encountered by neutral commerce in 
time of war, the government of HBM [His Britannic Majesty] is prepared 
to abandon the principle of contraband in case of war between powers 
which may sign a convention to that effect. The right of visit would be 
exercised, only in order to ascertain the neutral character of the merchant-
men.223  
 
When this initiative failed to garner a consensus and attracted negative votes 
from France, Germany, Russia, the United States, and Montenegro, the Brit-
ish delegation sought to take the initiative outside the Hague Conference 
(which was supposed to operate at something approaching unanimity). 
The support for the British initiative then fell away as it was seen as in-
appropriate to agree to a Convention at the Conference but outside the rules 
for the Conference. The proposed text would have stated “Goods belonging 
to a subject of a neutral contracting power on board neutral or enemy ships 
cannot be condemned as being contraband.”224 The proposal was dropped 
due to the opposition concerned with the venue. John Westlake hoped that 
the Convention could nevertheless be adopted at “an early date” through the 
“ordinary methods of diplomacy.”225 This did not happen. 
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Half a century later, in the wake of the Second World War and the pro-
hibition on resorting to any use of force by UN Member States against any 
other state, Lauterpacht ended his edited volume of Oppenheim’s International 
Law with the words: 
 
To the existing ingredients of prize law recent developments in Interna-
tional Law have added one consideration of vital significance, namely, that 
as a rule the war will be waged on one side in violation of a legal obligation 
of a fundamental nature. In such a contingency the guilty belligerent will 
not be able to claim the benefit of the doubt in a branch of law in which 
so much is controversial and unsettled.226  
 
Forty years later, Heintschel von Heinegg suggested that “With regard 
to measures directed against neutral vessels (aircraft), the law may be in a 
state of change.”227 But he offered only the following guide to the future: 
 
It is suggested, then, that the general status of neutral merchant shipping 
in an armed conflict de lege ferenda is as follows. At the outset, there is a 
rebuttable presumption for their general exemption from capture. The rea-
sons justifying capture (and probably diversion) will depend on the policy 
of the flag state. If its policy is not to support any of the belligerents with 
war material, strong reasons will be needed to justify capture. Minor stand-
ards will apply if the flag state’s policy is otherwise. Where the flag state is 
neither able nor willing to exercise the necessary control, belligerents will 
be entitled to exercise all those rights conferred upon them by the tradi-
tional law.228 
 
Again, as with capture for breach of blockade, the time has come to re-
late the draconian nature of these rules not just to the UN Charter, but to 
our desire to separate out the use of force that is necessary in self-defense 
from what States would like to do to win a war. Once we accept the right of 
capture and condemnation in prize for contraband violations, we end up 
accepting, it seems, the contingent rights to attack neutral vessels where they 
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are believed to be carrying contraband and, “after prior warning they inten-
tionally and clearly refuse to stop, or intentionally and clearly resist visit, 
search or capture.”229 Civil aircraft can be attacked where they  
 
are believed on reasonable grounds to be carrying contraband, and, after 
prior warning or interception, they intentionally and clearly refuse to divert 
from their destination, or intentionally and clearly refuse to proceed for 
visit and search to a belligerent airfield that is safe for the type of aircraft 
involved and reasonably accessible.230 
 
As we saw above, the wide nature of the contemporary understanding 
of contraband includes goods destined for the enemy, “which may be sus-
ceptible for use in armed conflict.” The uses and customs on contraband of 
war, according to H. Reason Pyke, “have been created by the action of bel-
ligerent rather than neutral states, and with a view to extending and not re-
stricting the advantages that accrue to a belligerent from the possession of a 
predominant command of the sea.”231 For him, writing in 1915, it was im-
possible for “nations at war to exercise the power and force required for the 
purpose of overthrowing each other without inflicting injury and loss upon 
the trade of other nations.”232 Today, we no longer believe that nations have 
any business overthrowing each other, and so States should not be accorded 
the necessary rights against neutrals to do this. And yet the old rules appar-
ently endure, with nefarious consequences. I would suggest that a belligerent 
State should no longer be able to claim that international law authorizes it to 
capture and permanently confiscate through a prize court the neutral ships 
and aircraft found to have been carrying contraband or engaging in unneutral 
service.233 
This is not only a question of respecting the rights of individuals and the 
rights of non-participating (neutral) States. As already stated, the rights to 
search and capture quickly turn into a right to target under certain conditions. 
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For example, a neutral civilian aircraft apparently becomes “a military objec-
tive” because it is suspected of carrying contraband and refusing to divert 
from its destination.234 I am not convinced by the orthodox argument that 
by behaving in this way, the ship or an aircraft has become a military objec-
tive and the crew are no longer protected civilians because they are directly 
participating in hostilities. 
The old Belligerent Rights need to be revised so that searching for con-
traband comes closer to law enforcement. Allowing the current regime to 
remain in place can only reinforce the mistaken idea that merchant shipping 
and civil aircraft might be fair game when it comes to capture, targeting, and 
destruction. 
 
C. Seizure of Enemy Merchant Ships, Aircraft, and Cargo 
 
Turning away from neutral property (or property belonging to individuals 
from non-participating States) and looking to private property belonging to 
enemy nationals, we might recall that there is no right for a belligerent to 
capture on land private property belonging to enemy nationals. The time has 
come to reject the idea that enemy commercial maritime traffic is so essential 
to winning the war that it should be not only seized, but also condemned 
and permanently acquired by the seizing State.235 As mentioned above, at 
one point the British government would have considered joining in the 
American idea of abolishing this Belligerent Right of capture at sea. The in-
structions to the British delegation in 1907 started by stating:  
 
Anything which restrains acts of war is in itself a step towards the abolition 
of all war, and by diminishing the apprehensions of the evils which war 
would cause, removes one incentive to expenditure upon armaments. It is 
also possible to imagine cases in which the interests of Great Britain might 
benefit by the adoption of this principle of immunity from capture.236 
 
But as explained previously, the utility of Blockade was considered too stra-
tegically important: “The British navy is the only offensive weapon which 
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Great Britain has against Continental Powers. The latter have a double 
means of offence: they have their navies and they have their powerful ar-
mies.”237 
In the end, the eventual Hague Convention VI on Enemy Merchant 
Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities (1907) only states that “it is desirable” 
that a merchant ship of a belligerent State be allowed to depart an enemy 
port after a period of grace, and it provides that certain merchant ships that 
were unable to leave, or ignorant of the outbreak of hostilities at the time of 
encounter with the enemy navy on the high seas, may not be confiscated but 
only detained and restored after the war without compensation, or alterna-
tively requisitioned or destroyed with compensation. 
The United States refused to join the treaty on the grounds that custom-
ary international law was already more protective of merchant shipping than 
the proposed treaty. James Brown Scott made the point that “it rarely hap-
pens that a vessel is provided on the outbound voyage with sufficient coal 
for the return.”238 This means that on the outbreak of War, whether it con-
tinues on to the belligerent port or attempts to return home, the enemy mer-
chant ship risks being captured. Moreover, he added even if it is indeed ig-
norant of the outbreak of hostilities at the time of being seized,  
 
it may be detained subject to restoration at the end of the war without 
compensation. The value of the vessel may be seriously depreciated in case 
of a long war. If requisitioned, it is unlikely that the transaction will be 
profitable to the original owner, and if destroyed it is improbable that the 
compensation will at all be adequate. The article in question, therefore, can 
not be considered an advance; it is a distinct limitation of customary 
rights.239 
 
On the other hand, the treaty was seen as too protective of merchant 
shipping by Russia and Germany. Both States formulated reservations as 
they felt disadvantaged; not having “naval stations in different parts of the 
world” that could receive the seized vessels, they would “find themselves 
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compelled to destroy them.” Japan became a party, while the United King-
dom and France eventually renounced the treaty, in 1925 and 1939, respec-
tively. 
In 2020 there were only thirty-one States parties to this treaty. At the 
time of its drafting commentators simply stated “[i]t is a well recognized rule 
of international law that private property belonging to the enemy on the sea 
is liable to capture.”240 The treaty merely regulates the exceptions, in order to 
“ensure the security of international commerce against the surprises of war.” 
One such exception is that there can be no capture where the enemy mer-
chant ship is met at sea and is ignorant of the outbreak of hostilities. Neither 
this treaty, nor any other multilateral treaty in force,241 would seem to grant 
the Belligerent Right to capture enemy merchant ships. 
The Hague Convention VI (1907) details which merchant ships cannot 
be captured. I do not see how such a treaty (which most experts consider is 
no longer in force), or the Hague Convention XI (1907) that, inter alia, ex-
empts coastal fishing vessels from capture (and has only 32 States parties), 
could justify a continuing universal right of any State to capture all other 
enemy merchant ships and aircraft.242 
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 I suppose some will argue for a continuing general customary right for 
States to capture enemy merchant ships (notwithstanding the limited signif-
icance of these treaties). They will claim it is for those who no longer believe 
in the right of capture to show that it has fallen into disuse, or been overtaken 
by the laws that outlaw war and prohibit the use of force. When we recall 
the longstanding nature of this right to capture rule, we might remember that 
enemy goods in the past included slaves, being transported on enemy ships 
or belonging to the enemy. In fact, in the eighteenth century, members of 
the crew on any captured ship that were Black or mixed race would be pre-
sumed to be slaves, even where they might have evidence they were free. 
Captured and sold as prize, such crew members proved useful to captains 
either as income or as additions to the crew. Prize law has an inglorious past. 
Charles Foy concludes his study: 
 
For Obadiah Gale and the hundreds of other black mariners sold into slav-
ery during the American Revolution, the newly established American prize 
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system was little different from its British colonial predecessor. Both sys-
tems presumed that blackness equaled enslavement. . . . With both systems 
predicated upon a desire to develop maritime forces through awarding 
prize monies, little priority was given to black mariners’ individual liberty. 
As a result, British and American prize systems ensured that going to sea 
involved anxiety for black seamen and their loved ones.243  
 
Returning to the present day, modern academic commentary on the cap-
ture of enemy property at sea is sparse, but again, Heintschel von Heinegg 
admits that the rule concerning capture and confiscation of enemy merchant 
ships and cargo may need to be reinterpreted or restricted in the light of the 
UN Charter’s restriction on the resort to force: 
 
In this context, one may consider exempting from capture passenger ves-
sels that are transporting civilians and no contraband articles, because cap-
ture always implies certain hazards for the ship concerned. If a belligerent 
wishes to make use of such a vessel, it can be requisitioned. Enemy mer-
chant vessels in enemy port at the outbreak of hostilities, however, are not, 
and never have been protected by any binding rule. Today, because it is 
possible to integrate almost any merchant vessel into naval forces without 
major technical difficulties, states will be even less willing to agree to such 
a rule than they were in 1907. Nevertheless, if the direct influence of the 
United Nations Charter on the law of economic warfare at sea is accepted, 
the legality of condemning enemy property will probably have to be recon-
sidered. If all measures have to meet the principles of necessity and pro-
portionality set out in the Charter, it is doubtful whether the acquisition of 
all enemy property at sea is legally justified.244 
 
The most recent military manual of New Zealand (2019) makes it clear that 
such a use of prize law is no longer considered normal in the contemporary 
context: 
 
                                                                                                                      
243. Charles Foy, Eighteenth Century “Prize Negroes”: From Britain to America, 31 SLAVERY 
AND ABOLITION 379, 388–89 (2010). Even where States were legislating against the impor-
tation of slaves, prize law was used to get around such restrictions, with slaves being sold 
after condemnation as good prize captured in war. See J.P. van Niekerk, Judge John Holland 
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Due to the nature of modern armed conflict, in particular the need to limit 
conflict as much as possible and return to peaceful conditions quickly, the 
exercise of prize jurisdiction for the purposes of permanently acquiring the 
ships and property of another State is almost unknown. It is generally not 
now appropriate for a State to profit financially from the waging of armed 
conflict. New Zealand warships may seize enemy merchant vessels and 
submit them for prize arbitration only with the express authority of CDF 
[Chief of Defence Force]. If practicable, the advice of an NZDF LEGAD 
[New Zealand Defence Force Legal Adviser] is to be obtained before a 
vessel is seized as a prize. A ship that is captured may, however, be held 
until the end of hostilities, which may require that it is tied up in a foreign 
port.245 
 
This captures perfectly the point with which I should like to conclude. 
If we have outlawed War as an institution at the disposal of States then we 
have to abolish the Belligerent Rights of States to benefit from War, or in-
deed any sort of armed conflict. It makes no sense to say that you cannot 
resort to armed conflict against another State and yet, if you do, you can keep 
the old Belligerent Rights that belonged to those that went to War. We do 
not outlaw burglary but then tell the law-breaker and home owner that they 
can keep what they find in the other’s house. 
                                                                                                                      
245. NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE, MANUAL OF ARMED FORCES LAW, supra note 
29, §10.6.15 (footnote omitted). 
